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1. Historical	Background.	Brentano	and	19th-Century	European	Philosophy	The	development	of	phenomenology	in	19th-century	German	philosophy	is	that	of	a	particular	stream	within	the	larger	historical-philosophical	complex	of	Austro-German	
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philosophy.	It	finds	its	origins	even	before	Hegel’s	death	in	1831,	in	the	teachings	and	works	of	Bernard	Bolzano,	and	develops	into	a	structured	whole	through	the	works	of	Franz	Brentano	and	his	school.	This	main	current	in	its	development	includes	other	parallel	Austrian	influences	from	Johann	Friedrich	Herbart,	Richard	Avenarius,	Ludwig	Boltzmann,	Ernst	Mach,	Ludwig	Wittgenstein,	and	the	members	of	the	Vienna	Circle;	and	contributions	from	its	natural	allies	in	German	philosophy,	especially	Friedrich	Trendelenburg,	Rudolph	Hermann	Lotze,	and	Gottlob	Frege.	It	has	had	further	ramifications	in	economics,	notably	in	the	works	of	Carl	Menger	and	Ludwig	von	Mises,	in	literature,	in	the	works	of	Franz	Kafka	and	Robert	Musil,	and	in	many	other	fields.1		 Brentano	is	the	backbone	of	Austro-German	philosophy	for	many	reasons.	He	came	to	Austria	in	1874,	which	he	considered	to	be	a	favorable	context	to	found	a	philosophical	school;2	he	was	instrumental	in	reintroducing	Bolzano,	the	grandfather	of	Austro-German	philosophy,	to	Austrian	philosophers;	he	trained	or	contributed	to	the	training	of	many	generations	of	Austro-German	philosophers,	ranging	from	Carl	Stumpf		and	Anton	Marty	to	Alexius	Meinong,	Thomas	Masaryk,	Christian	von	Ehrenfels,	Alois	Höfler,	Edmund	Husserl,	Kazimierz	Twardowski,	Oskar	Kraus	and	Schmuel	Hugo	Bergman;	and	he	was	an	acknowledged	influence	on	many	philosophers	ranging	from	Stout,	Moore,	and	Heidegger	to	the	Vienna	Circle	(the	authors	of	the	Manifesto)	and	many	other	late	20th-	and	early	21st-century	philosophers,	on	both	sides	of	the	analytic	vs.	continental	divide.	As	the	“grandfather	of	phenomenology”3	resp.	the	“disgusted	grandfather	of	phenomenology,”4	but	also	as	the	key	figure	on	the	“Anglo-Austrian	Analytic	Axis”	(Simons	1986;	Dummett	1988:7),	Brentano	is	at	the	source	of	the	two	main	philosophical	traditions	in	20th-century	philosophy.	In	this	article,	I	will	focus	mainly	on	his	place	in	19th-century	European	philosophy	and	on	the	central	themes	and	concepts	in	his	philosophy	that	were	determinant	in	the	development	of	the	philosophy	of	his	most	gifted	student:	Edmund	Husserl.		
																																																								
1 Cf. other similar definitions of Austrian and Austro-German philosophy in Haller (1979), Simons (2000), 
Smith (1981, 1989, 1994, 1996), and Mulligan (1989, 1990, 1997, 2001, 2012). 
2 On his philosophical appreciation of Austria, see for instance his inaugural lecture “On the Causes of 
Discouragement in the Philosophical Domain”, in Brentano (1929, pp. 85ff). See also his recollections in his 
letter to Bergman from 1909, published in Bergman (1946, p. 125). On his project to found a school as such, see 
Brentano (1895, p. 34), Husserl (1919/1976, pp. 156ff/48ff), and Fisette and Fréchette (2007, pp. 14ff) for 
further sources. 
3 See Baumgartner (2003). 
4 Ryle (1976). 
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Aristotle’s	Heir	Brentano’s	interest	in	philosophy	was	doubtless	largely	conditioned	by	the	great	philosophical	and	literary	talents	in	his	family,	and	its	role	in	the	development	of	German	Romanticism.	His	uncle	Clemens	Brentano	and	his	aunt	Bettina	von	Arnim	marked	the	history	of	German	Romanticism,	and	are	among	the	direct	successors	of	Goethe	and	the	Weimarer	Klassik.	His	father,	Christian	Brentano,	was	well	known	as	a	Catholic	writer.	He	took	a	great	interest	in	philosophy,	and	was	instrumental	in	publishing	the	Nachlass	of	his	brother	Clemens.	He	supposedly	attended	Schelling’s	first	lectures	in	Jena,	which	left	him	with	a	terrible	impression.5		The	young	Franz	started	his	studies	in	Munich	in	1856,	under	the	supervision	of	Ernst	von	Lasaulx,	who	was	also	a	friend	of	his	uncle	and	on	whom	he	had	previously	made	a	very	good	impression.6	He	spent	two	years	in	Munich,	after	which	he	went	to	Berlin	to	study	Aristotle	under	the	supervision	of	Trendelenburg.	Later,	Brentano	would	write	that	he	did	not	always	consider	Trendelenburg’s	method	of	closely	studying	text	appropriate,	and	that	it	was	in	fact	Aquinas	who	was	his	foremost	guide	to	Aristotelian	philosophy.7	In	Münster,	he	spent	an	academic	year	working	under	the	supervision	of	Franz	Jakob	Clemens	and	Christoph	Bernhard	Schlüter,	who	not	only	trained	him	in	medieval	philosophy,	but	also	introduced	him	to	Neo-Scholasticism.8																																																									
5 See his biography in Christian Brentano (1854, XIV). 
6 From Lasaulx’s correspondence as quoted in Stöltzle (1904, p. 231): “Franz is in fact a subtle man, whom I like 
very much“ (“Franz ist in der Tat ein feinsinniger Mensch, der mir sehr wohl gefällt.”)  
7 See his letter to Hugo Bergman of January 22, 1908, published in Bergman (1946, p. 106). “I am far from 
denying that he [Trendelenburg] was once my master. It was indeed he who guided me to Aristotle. And as I was 
attending his lectures on Aristotle, I compared in the library the commentaries of the great schoolman [Aquinas] 
and found there some passages favorably explained, which Trendelenburg was not able to make 
comprehensible.” See also Brentano’s letter to the Prussian Academy of Sciences in 1914: “With Trendelenburg, 
I shared all my life the conviction that philosophy is capable of a truly scientific approach, but that it is 
incompatible with such an approach when, without any reverence toward the ideas transmitted by the great 
thinkers of earlier times, it aims to insert them anew in every head. Therefore, I followed his example when I 
dedicated some years of my life to the study of the works of Aristotle, which he taught me to consider as an 
unexploited treasure trove. The same conviction that there are no prospects for true success in philosophy when 
one does not proceed as in other scientific disciplines brought me to the conviction not to embrace everything at 
the outset, but rather to concentrate my whole energy on a few relatively simple tasks, as did Archimedes, 
Galilei, and according to his own report, Newton, who allegedly compared his work with that of a child fishing 
out a few shells from the sea. Here, not only does the old saying that the half is greater than the whole obtain, as 
it seems to me: even for a minuscule part, one can say that it is better to tackle it than wanting to embrace the 
whole for then, in reality, one embraces nothing.” Letter quoted in Oberkofler (1989:IXf.) Husserl famously 
adapted Brentano’s motto using a monetary metaphor: “Not always the big bills, gentlemen: small change, small 
change!” quoted in Gadamer (1987, p. 107). 
8 Brentano’s third habilitation thesis (see Brentano 1866/1929, p. 137) was partly inspired by Clemens, who 
published a well-known book (Clemens 1856) on philosophy as a servant to theology. For some time, Brentano 
first planned to write his dissertation on Suarez under the supervision of Clemens, who was famous for his 
scholarship on Suarez. First drafts of this dissertation are deposited in Brentano’s Nachlass at the Houghton 
Library of Harvard University. 
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From	1860	to	1862,	Brentano	spent	most	of	his	time	working	on	his	PhD	dissertation	on	the	various	meanings	of	being	in	Aristotle	(Brentano	1862).	Shortly	after	his	doctorate,	he	entered	the	Dominican	convent	in	Graz	as	a	novice,	but	left	only	a	few	months	later.	He	took	holy	orders	in	the	Catholic	seminary	in	Würzburg	in	August	1864.	 Brentano’s	dissertation	made	a	good	impression	on	Trendelenburg,	who	suggested	to	Ernst	Mach	in	1865	that	he	be	appointed	to	a	chair	in	philosophy	in	Graz.9	The	same	year,	Brentano	submitted	his	Psychology	of	Aristotle	(published	later	as	Brentano	1867/1977)	as	habilitation	thesis	in	Würzburg.10	The	25	theses	defended	in	his	habilitation	examination	in	1866	(Brentano	1866)	attest	to	the	continuity	of	Brentano’s	philosophical	programme.	He	defended	most	of	them	later	in	his	career.	In	this,	he	followed	his	masters	Trendelenburg,	Clemens,	and	Lasaulx	in	their	critical	stance	toward	Kant	and	Hegel	and	their	interest	in	a	scientific	philosophy,	along	with	influences	from	French	positivism,	empiricism,	Aristotle,	and	Aquinas.	The	set	of	particular	positions	taken	by	Trendelenburg,	Clemens,	and	Lasaulx	is	complex,	but	a	quick	look	at	their	basic	philosophical	views	shows	that	they	complement	each	other	in	a	way	which	Brentano	was	obviously	aware	of,	with	a	decisive	impact	on	his	philosophical	education.	The	renewal	of	Catholic	philosophy	proposed	by	the	Neo-Scholastic	stream	propounded	by	Clemens	was	directed,	among	other	targets,	against	Günther’s	Hegel-inspired	speculative	theology.11	Analogously,	Trendelenburg’s	efforts	to	return	to	Aristotle’s	theory	of	categories	was	also	directed	against	Kant’s	deduction	of	the	categories	and	the	kind	of	systematic	philosophy	that	emerged	from	it	via	Hegel	and	Schelling.	On	another	level,	Lasaulx’s	Kulturpessimismus	and	his	theory	of	the	history	of	philosophy	as	a	Verfallsgeschichte	was	also	directed	against	the	so-called	modern	and	progressive	tendencies	represented	by	the	bourgeois	philosophies	of	Kant	and	Hegel.	In	this	respect	Brentano’s	philosophy	of	history	(even	in	its	earliest	form:	see	Brentano	1867a)	shares	many	similarities	with	Lasaulx’s	Philosophie	der	Geschichte	(1856),	which	defends	a	historical	positivism	close	to	Comte’s	view	of	the	three	stages	of	history	–	an	approach	that	was	influential	in	the	conservative	German	circles	to	which	Brentano’s	family,	including	Brentano	himself,	belonged.12	
																																																								
9 On this, see the correspondence between Mach and Trendelenburg published in Thiele (1978, p. 205). 
10 On these dates, see Stumpf (1922, p. 29). 
11 On Clemens as the main German representative of Neo-Scholasticism, see Stöckl (1870, p. 836). 
12 On Lasaulx’s cyclical Verfallsgeschichte, see Schnabel (1937, p. 168) and in particular Schoeps 
(1953, pp. 62ff.).  
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Brentano	started	lecturing	in	Würzburg	as	a	Privatdozent	in	philosophy	in	1866.	His	first	lectures	dealt	with	the	history	of	philosophy,	followed	soon	after	by	metaphysics.	His	early	Würzburg	lectures	were	attended	by	Carl	Stumpf,	Anton	Marty,	Carl	van	Endert,	Ernst	Commer,	Ludwig	Schütz,	and	Hermann	Schell.13	Not	only	did	Brentano	have	a	strong	philosophical	influence	on	them	at	the	time,	he	was	also	their	main	reference	in	religious	affairs.		The	school	of	Brentano	might	have	developed	quite	differently	if	Brentano	had	not	been	commissioned	in	1869	by	the	Bishop	of	Mainz,	Ketteler,	to	draught	a	memorandum	on	papal	infallibility	in	preparation	for	the	first	Vatican	Council,	which	started	in	December	of	that	year.	In	this	document	(Brentano	1969),	Brentano	relies	mainly	on	philosophical	arguments	to	argue	against	papal	infallibility.	The	work	on	this	memorandum	was	the	beginning	of	his	crisis	of	faith,14	and	led	him	to	the	conclusion	that	all	dogmas	are	based	on	real	and	insoluble	contradictions.15		Even	before	writing	this	memorandum,	however,	Brentano	was	already	very	optimistic	about	the	possibility	of	a	theistic	version	of	positivism	in	the	philosophy	of	the	sciences,	which	would	be	supported	by	an	Aristotelian	metaphysics.	His	discussions	of	the	works	of	Helmholtz,	Mill,	Comte,	and	Whewell	in	his	1867/68	lectures	on	metaphysics	already	show	that	he	was	well	acquainted	with	positivism	at	the	time.	The	connection	between	his	views	on	the	natural	sciences,	metaphysics,	and	theology	became	clear	in	a	lecture	he	gave	in	Würzburg	in	1869	(and	in	1879	in	Vienna),	where	he	argued	that	the	second	law	of	thermodynamics	formulated	by	Clausius	and	Thomson	(Lord	Kelvin)	offers	a	support	for	the	cosmological	proof	for	the	existence	of	God,	as	Thomson	(1855)	and	Clausius	(1865)	had	argued	before	him.16		With	the	proclamation	of	the	papal	infallibility	in	July	1870,	Brentano	progressively	abandoned	his	Catholic	convictions,	but	maintained	his	position	as	a	priest	(and	his	position	as	professor	of	philosophy	at	Würzburg)	until	April	1873.	His	official	defection	came	only	a	few	weeks	before	he	became	involved	in	discussions	for	the	appointment	of	a	replacement	for	the	chair	of	Franz	Lott	in	Vienna,	which	he	obtained	with	the	support	of	Lotze.		
																																																								
13 See Stumpf (1919/1976, p. 103/19). 
14 See Fels (1926/27), Utitz (1954, p. 77), Hertling (1919, pp. 208ff), Freudenberger (1969, pp. 148ff), Fisette 
and Fréchette (2007, pp. 25ff)  
15 See Stumpf (1922, p. 71). 
16 See Brentano (2016). 
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As	his	position	in	Würzburg	became	increasingly	uncomfortable	after	his	“inner	break”	with	the	Church,	in	the	spring	of	1872	he	took	a	sabbatical	term,	traveling	to	England	where	he	met	with	other	opponents	of	infallibilism	–	most	notably	William	Robertson	Smith,	Cardinal	Newman,	Herbert	Spencer,	and	George	Jackson	Mivart.	He	returned	to	Würzburg	in	the	late	summer	of	1872,	and	gave	his	last	semester	of	lectures	there	in	1872/73.	The	1872/73	lectures	on	psychology	bear	the	influence	of	British	empiricism,	which	Brentano	studied	intensively	during	his	stay	in	London.	They	were	also	the	basis	on	which	he	started	work	on	his	Psychology	from	an	Empirical	Standpoint,	particularly	during	the	summer	and	fall	of	1873.	His	Psychology	was	conceived	as	a	six-volume	project,	which	would	cover	investigations	on	1)	Psychology	as	a	science;	2)	Psychical	phenomena	in	general;	3)	Presentations;	4)	Judgements;	5)	Acts	of	love	and	hate;	and	6)	The	immortality	of	the	soul.	Ultimately	only	the	first	volume	and	the	first	part	of	the	second	were	published,	in	Brentano	(1874).	Brentano	continued	with	work	on	the	third	volume	in	spring	1875,	but	abandoned	the	project	shortly	thereafter.17		
Brentano	and	his	School	Brentano	came	to	Vienna	with	the	project	of	founding	a	school	and	encouraging	Austrian	youth	to	enter	philosophy,18	and	found	immediate	success.	The	most	prominent	among	his	first	Vienna	students	were	Tomás	Masaryk	(who	would	later	be	instrumental	in	introducing	Husserl	to	Brentano),	Sigmund	Freud,	Alexius	Meinong,	Alois	Höfler,	Benno	Kerry,	Alfred	Berger,	and	Christian	von	Ehrenfels.		However,	Brentano’s	academic	career	in	Vienna	took	an	unexpected	turn	in	1880,	when	he	decided	to	marry	Ida	Lieben.	At	the	time,	as	a	former	priest	he	was	not	eligible	to	marry	under	Austrian	law.	He	thus	repudiated	the	Austrian	citizenship	that	he	had	acquired	through	his	appointment,	which	also	forced	him	to	resign	from	his	chair;	he	acquired	Saxon	citizenship	and	married	in	Leipzig	in	September	1880.	He	then	continued	to	lecture	in	Vienna	as	a	Privatdozent.	Although	the	ministry	promised	to	reinstate	him	in	his	chair	on	multiple	occasions,	this	never	happened.	This,	along	with	other	difficulties	with	the	authorities,	as	well	as	the	death	of	his	wife,	led	Brentano	to																																																									
17 Even before the first book was published on Easter 1874, Brentano wrote to Lotze about his doubts on the 
project. Years later, in a diary entry from 1904, he detailed the motives of his decision not to continue the project 
on the basis of his view that psychology was not yet ready at that time for such comprehensive works. See 
Falckenberg (1901, p. 112) Fréchette (2012, pp. 104ff), and Rollinger (2012, p. 301). 
18 See Bergmann (1946, p. 306). 
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leave	Vienna	in	1895.	He	made	the	decision	public	and	explained	it	in	detail	in	a	public	lecture	in	1894,	and	the	story	soon	came	to	be	known	in	Vienna	as	the	Affaire	
Brentano.19	His	later	teaching	in	Vienna	was	particularly	fruitful.	Among	his	most	important	students	from	the	post-1870	Vienna	period,	we	find	Franz	Hillebrand,	Emil	Arleth,	Kazimierz	Twardowski,	Hans	Schmidkunz,	Josef	Clemens	Kreibig,	and	Edmund	Husserl.		Brentano’s	last	years,	between	1895	and	1917,	were	spent	mostly	between	Schönbühel,	his	summer	residence	on	the	Danube,	and	Florence,	where	he	elected	domicile.	His	former	students	visited	him	regularly	in	both	places,	and	sent	their	own	students	to	study	Brentano’s	philosophy	with	the	master	himself.	Marty’s	students	were	particularly	receptive	to	this	offer:	Hugo	Bergman,	Alfred	Kastil,	Oskar	Kraus,	Emil	Utitz,	and	Josef	Eisenmeier	all	came	from	Prague	and	visited	Brentano	regularly,	assisting	him	in	dictations	and	readings,	which	became	necessary	after	1903,	when	he	underwent	an	eye	operation	that	left	him	almost	completely	blind.	In	particular,	Oskar	Kraus	and	Alfred	Kastil	played	an	important	role	in	publishing	some	of	Brentano’s	lectures	in	the	1920s	and	1930s.		
Husserl	Not	only	did	Brentano	fulfill	his	desire	to	found	a	philosophical	school,	but	he	also	transmitted	this	desire	to	many	of	his	students.	This	was	the	case	of	Meinong	(Graz),	Marty	(Prague),	Stumpf	(Berlin),	Twardowski	(Lemberg),	Hillebrand	(Innsbruck),	and	of	course	Husserl	(Göttingen/Freiburg).	His	phenomenology	influenced	several	generations,	starting	from	the	Munich	and	Göttingen	phenomenologists	and	extending	to	the	later	generation	of	Freiburg	phenomenologists	after	1919.	But	first	a	few	more	remarks	on	Husserl	in	this	specific	context.	Two	years	after	Brentano	was	appointed	in	Vienna,	he	sent	one	of	his	first	doctoral	students,	Tomáš	Masaryk,	to	spend	some	time	in	Leipzig	studying	psychology	under	the	supervision	of	Wundt.20	It	was	on	this	occasion	that	Masaryk	met	a	fellow	Moravian,	the	young	Edmund	Husserl,	who	attended	Wundt’s	lectures	as	a	first-year	undergraduate.	Masaryk	suggested	to	Husserl	that	he	go	to	Vienna	to	study	under	
																																																								
19 See for example Anonymous (1894, 1894a, 1895). 
20 This was also the case of Twardowski: see Twardowski (1991/1999). 
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Brentano,	but	the	young	Husserl	was	in	Leipzig	to	study	under	Weierstrass.	He	later	continued	his	studies	in	mathematics	in	Vienna,	completing	his	doctorate	in	1883.	Husserl	was	heading	for	a	career	in	mathematics,	and	accepted	a	position	as	assistant	to	Weierstrass	in	Berlin,	where	he	spent	a	semester.	In	autumn	1883	he	enrolled	in	military	service,	during	which	his	interest	in	philosophy	grew	considerably	After	having	spent	the	last	part	of	his	military	service	in	Vienna,	he	decided	to	begin	attending	Brentano’s	lectures	after	completing	his	service.	Husserl	spent	two	years	in	Vienna	attending	all	of	Brentano’s	lectures	and	seminars:	on	practical	philosophy,	elementary	logic,	Hume’s	Essay	on	Human	
Understanding,	psychology	and	aesthetics,	and	The	Limits	of	our	Knowledge	of	Nature	by	Du	Bois-Reymond	(1872/1874).21	Husserl	left	a	positive	impression	on	Brentano,	who	invited	him	to	spend	his	summer	holidays	with	him	on	Lake	Wolfgang	near	Salzburg,	and	even,	together	with	his	wife	Ida,	painted	a	portrait	of	him.22	Since	Brentano	himself,	acting	at	this	time	only	as	a	Privatdozent	in	Vienna,	was	not	in	a	position	to	habilitate	Husserl,	he	suggested	that	he	go	either	to	Prague,	to	habilitate	under	Marty,	or	to	Halle,	to	habilitate	under	Stumpf.23	Husserl	left	for	Halle,	and	a	year	later	obtained	his	Habilitation	with	a	thesis	on	the	concept	of	number.	The	work	was	expanded	a	few	years	later	into	the	Philosophy	of	Arithmetics	(1891/2003),	Husserl’s	contribution	to	a	Brentanian	philosophy	of	mathematics,	which	he	dedicated	to	Brentano.	Husserl	spent	14	years	in	Halle	as	a	Privatdozent.	The	publication	of	his	magnum	opus,	the	Logical	Investigations,	in	1900-01,	was	a	turning	point	both	in	his	career	and	his	philosophical	development.	The	good	reception	that	the	work	received	from	Dilthey,	the	Neo-Kantians,	and	the	Göttingen	mathematicians	facilitated	his	appointment	in	Göttingen.	Philosophically,	Husserl’s	views	evolved	considerably	between	his	Philosophy	
of	Arithmetics	and	the	Logical	Investigations.	Many	different	factors	contributed	to	this	evolution,	including	among	others	his	correspondence	with	Frege	and	his	studies	of	the	philosophical	works	of	Bolzano	in	the	mid-1890s.	These	led	him	to	his	critique	of	psychologism	in	the	Logical	Investigations,	whose	epigraph	was	Goethe’s	proverbial	remark	that	“one	is	against	nothing	more	stridently	than	the	errors	one	has	first	set																																																									
21 See Husserl (1919, p. 155/1976, p. 48).  
22 According to Spiegelberg (1981, pp. 119-122) the painting was destroyed in the bombing of Antwerp in 1940.  
23 On April 8, 1886, Brentano wrote to Marty: “Dr. Husserl and Hillebrand are thinking about going to Prague 
this summer. Unfortunately, I could not tell them what you plan to lecture on.” On October 22, 1886, he wrote 
again to Marty: “Husserl has now left for Halle. I recommended him to Stumpf with the reserves that seemed 
appropriate: I want to see what Stumpf thinks of him.”  
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aside.”	We	will	return	later	(section	3)	to	the	critique	of	psychologism,	which	played	a	central	role	in	the	development	of	phenomenology.		
2. Some	General	Principles	of	Brentano’s	Philosophy	Insofar	as	phenomenology	is	originally	a	specific	branch	of	Austro-German	philosophy,	Brentano	and	Husserl	should	be	taken	equally	as	its	founders.	Like	Christianity,	phenomenology	underwent	schisms	that	divided	the	original	territory	into	different	subterritories.	One	of	the	first	schisms	occurred	after	Husserl’s	sudden	discovery	of	his	Ego	in	1913.24	This	discovery	slowly	brought	Husserl	onto	the	path	of	Southwestern	Neo-Kantianism,	a	philosophy	that	is	directly	opposed	to	the	original	thrust	of	phenomenology.	From	the	perspective	of	Brentano’s	students,	his	philosophical	heirs,	and	their	contemporaries,	another	important	schism	became	manifest	with	the	publication	of	Heidegger’s	Being	and	Time	in	1927	and	his	1929	inaugural	lecture	What	
is	Metaphysics?25		However,	since	this	article	is	concerned	with	the	origins	of	phenomenology,	we	will	only	deal	here	with	themes	and	concepts	which	are	central	to	phenomenology	as	a	branch	of	Austro-German	philosophy:	i.e.,	those	which	were	in	place	before	the	various	schisms	described	above.	The	focus	is	on	these	themes	and	concepts	as	they	relate	directly	to	the	basic	principles	of	Brentano’s	philosophy,	or	their	determinant	role	in	the	development	of	further	Austro-German	streams	that	originated	in	phenomenology:	Gestalt	psychology,	the	theory	of	objects,	Munich-Göttingen	phenomenology,	and	many	other	movements	in	20th-century	philosophy.	As	mentioned	earlier,	Brentano’s	25	habilitation	theses	from	1866	document	his	programme	in	philosophy.	This	set	of	25	propositions,	characterizing	the	correct	methodology	for	philosophy,	the	connection	between	language	and	thought,	drawing	the	line	between	good	and	bad	philosophy,	and	stating	the	core	principles	of	ethics	and	metaphysics,	present	some	of	the	most	fundamental	and	durable	ideas	in	Brentano’s	philosophy.	Following	the	inner	structure	of	these	propositions,26	it	is	reasonable	to	
																																																								
24 Husserl announced the discovery in a rather discreet manner, as a footnote in the second edition of the Logical 
Investigations (Husserl 2001, p. 353). On Husserl’s discovery of the self, see Fréchette (2013a). 
25 On the reactions of the Brentanians, see for instance Kraus (1931, p. 140) and Stumpf (1930). Carnap 
(1931, pp. 230-1) and Ryle (1931, pp. 230-1), who were otherwise both sympathetic to some aspects of early 
phenomenology, also noticed the change of perspective. 
26 Contrary to the work that it prefigures, there has been little study of the inner structure of Brentano (1866). 
Kraus categorized the themes of the theses: methodology, ontology and metaphysics, continuity, psychology, 	
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isolate	five	general	principles	among	them,	which	can	serve	here	as	a	guide	to	Brentano’s	conception	of	philosophy:			
five	general	principles	form	Brentano’s	philosophy	a) Philosophy	is	a	science:	philosophy	should	be	practiced	as	a	science	in	the	unitary	sense	of	the	term,	which	excludes	a	distinction	between	speculative	and	exact	sciences,	and	which	means	using	the	same	methods	as	the	natural	sciences	(see	theses	1	and	4);		b) Anti-Kantianism:	Kantianism,	including	its	views	on	the	proofs	of	the	existence	of	God,	is	false	(see	theses	1,	6,	7);		c) Empiricism:	philosophy	starts	from	experience	(see	theses	12,	13,	14,	15);	d) The	mereological	nature	of	substance:	the	accident	contains	its	substance;	there	are	ultimate	specific	determinations	of	the	substance,	but	since	we	do	not	have	an	intuition	of	an	individual	substance	in	all	its	determinations	–	we	only	have	intuitions	of	an	individual	substance	through	the	accidents	given	in	intuitive	perception	–	we	cannot	properly	know	it27	(see	theses	16,	17).	e) Correctness	principle:	something	has	value	just	when	it	is	correct	to	love	it;	a	judgment	is	true	just	when	it	is	correct	to	acknowledge	(anerkennen)	the	existence	of	its	object	(see	theses	24,	25).28		Further	principles	of	Brentano’s	philosophy,	which	are	formulated	in	the	25	habilitation	theses,	also	played	an	important	role	in	his	intellectual	development,	although	for	various	reasons	they	do	not	share	the	privileged	position	of	the	five	basic	principles	in	his	system:			
																																																																																																																																																																													
philosophy of language, freedom of the will, ethics, and aesthetics (Brentano 1929, p. 165). Detailed discussions 
of some of the theses can be found in Gilson (1955), Ingarden (1969), and Sauer (2000). 
27 The idea behind theses 16 and 17 is that the accident contains the substance and, analogously, that our 
concepts (e.g., the concept of redness) contain in themselves the intuition of something red. Like accidents, 
concepts are one-sidedly detachable from the intuition at their base (resp. from substance). See the quote in 
Chrudzimski (2004, p. 142). Thesis 16 is about the logical parts of a whole, which stand in a line of predication 
and which constitute, as a whole, the individual of a kind. Thesis 17 is about the metaphysical parts of a whole: 
every metaphysical part is different. 
28 Cf. also Brentano (1889/1902, p. 17/15f). 
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f) Metaphysical	continuism:	space	is	a	finite,	non-empty	continuum	(theses	8,	9,	10);	g) Linguistic	empiricism:	language	was	developed	as	an	auxiliary	tool	for	thought	(theses	18,	19).		This	is	a	corollary	of	principle	(c).		h) Logical	reductionism:	Some	judgments,	like	disjunctive	judgments,	are	simply	linguistic	formulations	of	other,	more	fundamental,	forms	of	judgments	(theses	20,	21);	i) Indeterminism	is	not	a	challenge	to	free	will	(thesis	23);29	j) Philosophy	should	not	be	considered	a	servant	to	theology,	although	theology	might	sometimes	serve	as	a	guiding	star30	(theses	2	and	3).			Among	the	various	reasons	why	principles	(f)	to	(j)	do	not	count	as	basic	principles,	it	may	be	helpful	to	stress	a	few	in	particular:	changes	in	Brentano’s	views	at	different	stages	of	his	development	(e.g.,	principle	i);	insights	that	would	be	substantially	developed	only	later	(e.g.,	principle	h);	the	limited	application	of	certain	insights	to	a	specific	domain	of	philosophy	(principles	f	and	g);	and	having	metaphilosophical	significance	chiefly	outside	philosophy,	and	therefore	not	being	directly	relevant	as	a	
philosophical	principle	(principle	j).		 Some	of	these	five	general	principles	are	deliberately	formulated	here	so	as	to	be	interpretable	in	more	than	one	way,	for	two	reasons.	First,	there	is	no	documentation,	besides	cryptic	marginal	notes	by	Brentano	himself,	on	how	he	actually	defended	the	theses	during	his	disputatio.	Second,	and	consequently,	Brentano’s	later	philosophy	must	be	used	to	substantiate	the	principles.	Since	he	changed	his	mind	more	than	once	on	many	philosophical	matters,	the	five	general	principles	are	illustrated	differently	depending	on	the	particular	view	discussed.	 		
Principle	(a):	Philosophy	as	a	science																																																									
29 This position differs from Brentano’s later compatibilist position on free will, from the 1870s onwards, for 
instance in Grundlage der Ethik, where he rejects indeterminism and argues for a compatibilist account. Kraus 
argues in Brentano (1929, p. 180) that the early Brentano was an indeterminist, but besides principle (i) and a 
small remark by Stumpf (1919, p. 106/1976, p. 21) there is no clear evidence that he has been an indeterminist in 
his early years.  
30 On the guiding star (stellae rectrices), see Werle (1989, p. 134) and Sauer (2000, p. 128).  On the guidance of 
theology, see particularly Brentano’s teacher Clemens (1859, p. 15ff), on the “guidance of theology.” The 
rejection of papal infallibility expressed in 1869 (reproduced in Freudenberger 1969) seems to articulate a clean 
break with this idea behind principle (j). For an alternative reading of the connection of principle (j) to the core 
principle (a), see Brandl (forthcoming).  
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According	to	principle	(a),	philosophy	must	oppose	the	distinction	between	exact	and	speculative	sciences,	since	this	opposition	is	its	condition	of	existence	(thesis	1)	and	the	methods	of	philosophy	are	none	other	than	the	methods	of	the	natural	sciences	(thesis	4).	The	first	thesis	was	directed	among	other	things	against	speculative	idealistic	projects	like	that	of	Schelling;31	but	it	was	equally	directed	against	a	restricted	understanding	of	the	“exact”	sciences	as	consisting	only	of	studies	involving	quantitative	measurements.32	Brentano’s	ideal	of	philosophy	as	a	science	combines	the	idea	that	there	is	a	sense	of		“speculation”	according	to	which	metaphysics	is	a	speculative,	and	yet	exact,	enterprise	–	even	more	so	than	“exact	physics”	(in	a	sense	i	akin	to	Comte’s	positive	method	a	positive	speculation)33	–	with	the	idea	that	true	science	must	also	allow	for	this	kind	of	“speculative	exactness,”	and	not	only	for	the	kind	of	exactness	required	by	quantitative	measurements.		 Given	this	reading	of	thesis	1,	it	is	easier	to	understand	the	sense	in	which	Brentano	considers	that	philosophy	be	understood	as	a	science,	and	his	claim	that	it	shares	its	methods	with	natural	sciences.	Like	the	natural	sciences,	philosophy	uses	methods	such	as	observation,	deduction,	and	induction,	insofar	as	they	are	applicable	to	the	objects	of	their	investigation.	However,	this	does	not	mean	that	all	philosophical	investigations	should	be	conducted	with	the	methods	of	the	natural	sciences,	which	would	amount	to	naturalism.	Rather,	as	suggested	in	thesis	1,	there	is	a	sense	in	which	philosophical	investigations	can	be	speculative	and	yet	exact	and	scientific	in	the	true	sense.34	Principle	(a)	therefore	allows	for	a	unitary	sense	of	science	by	virtue	of	the	identity	of	methods	between	philosophy	and	natural	sciences	(insofar	as	they	deal	with	the	same	objects,	i.e.,	physical	phenomena),	while	leaving	room	for	a	kind	of	exactness	in	philosophy	which	makes	it	scientific	in	a	broader	sense	than	that	implied	by	the	strict	commonality	of	methods	referred	to	in	thesis	4.35																																																											
31 In particular, it is directed against Schelling’s view that philosophy should cut itself off from all domains of 
“ordinary knowledge” (gemeines Wissen), as programmatically announced in the first issue of his New Journal 
for Speculative Physics (Schelling 1802, p. 34; 1859, p. 262). This passage has often been quoted in the school 
of Brentano as the example par excellence of the dangers of speculative idealism in philosophy. See Brentano 
(1929, p. 104) or Stumpf (1908, p. 17).  
32 See Brentano (1987, p. 6) and Oberkofler (1989:5). 
33 See Brentano (1968:127) and (Sauer 2000, p. 124) 
34 See Brentano (1987:303) 
35 See also Haller (1993) for a similar reading, which makes it possible to draw a direct connection between 
Brentano’s fourth thesis and the Vienna Circle’s project of a unitary science. In his introduction to the 
philosophy of sciences that is much influenced by the Vienna circle, Richard von Mises (1939/1956) quotes 
Brentano’s thesis 4 as an epigraph. On exactness as a method in descriptive psychology, see Mulligan (1989). 
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Principle	(b):	Anti-Kantianism	Principle	(b)	follows	to	some	extent	from	thesis	1,	which	supports	principle	(a),	insofar	as	the	rejection	of	speculative	idealism	is	concerned.	It	is	also	a	correlate	of	principle	(c).	In	1866,	Brentano	argued	against	Kantianism,	albeit	only	an	aspect	of	Kant’s	ideas,	namely	his	philosophy	of	religion.	Thesis	6	is	a	nice	example	that	Brentano	used	to	disclose	the	weaknesses	of	Kantianism.		In	it	he	negates	Kant’s	idea	that	the	design	argument	for	the	existence	of	God	can	only	prove	an	order	of	the	world,	but	not	an	author	of	the	world.	In	Kant’s	view,	the	hypothesis	of	a	creator	of	the	world	on	the	basis	of	observed	causal	relations	between	phenomena	is	not	justified	because	the	gap	between	empirical	data	and	their	relations	and	the	absolute	determinations	of	the	highest	cause	of	the	world	is	unbridgeable.36	Brentano	argues,	against	this	view,	that	Kant’s	conclusion	simply	stands	square	with	his	own	conception	of	synthetic	a	priori	truths:	after	all,	if	Kant	holds	the	law	of	causality	to	be	a	synthetic	a	priori	truth,	then	the	fact	that	we	do	not	experience	God	as	a	primary	cause	cannot	possibly	be	an	obstacle	to	the	design	argument.37	Besides,	Brentano	argues,	the	assumption	of	a	creator	is	reasonable	simply	on	the	basis	of	the	probability	calculus,	and	does	not	involve	reliance	on	the	cosmological	or	ontological	arguments,	as	Kant	contends.		Thesis	7	deals	with	Kant’s	discussion	of	God	as	ens	realissimum	in	the	Critique	of	
Pure	Reason	(B	604ff).	Brentano	argues	that	Kant	is	wrong	in	saying	that	the	existence	of	God	as	a	creator	does	not	imply	God’s	infinite	perfection.	The	argument	supporting	the	thesis	can	be	deductively	construed:	supposing	that	a	creator	exists,	we	can	deduce	the	creator’s	infinite	perfection,	since	to	“create	out	of	nothing”	means	to	have	an	unconditioned	effect;	having	such	an	unconditioned	creative	effect	is	incommensurably	superior	to	having	a	conditioned	effect,	and	having	an	unconditioned	effect	is	not	possible	by	simply	adding	conditioned	and	finite	effects;	therefore,	if	God	exists,	by	deduction,	he	must	have	infinite	perfection.38	The	argument	behind	thesis	6	is	a	central	element	in	Brentano’s	anti-Kantianism:	if	synthetic	a	priori	truths	are	truths	that	obtain	independently	of	experience,	and	if	temporal	and	spatial	determinations	are	forms	of	our	understanding,	then	any	synthetic	a	priori	truth	about	temporal	or	spatial	determination	is	simply	made	true	by	our	understanding,	which	is	a	standard	to	which	even	Kant	himself	cannot	live	up	to.																																																									
36 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (B: 651-658). 
37 See Brentano (1968, p. 86) and Hoppenstedt (1933:64). 
38 See also Brentano (1929:171). 
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Therefore,	excluding	experience	as	one	of	the	foundations	of	knowledge	gives	us	at	best	“blind	prejudices,”	Brentano’s	epithet	for	Kant’s	synthetic	a	priori	truths.39	In	Brentano’s	opinion,	Kant	and	Reid	adopt	the	same	basic	idea	that	there	are	common	sense	judgments	–	judgments	which,	though	they	are	not	evident,	appear	to	be	certain	and	likely	to	found	a	science.	On	Brentano’s	view,	Kant	goes	too	far	in	his	fight	against	skepticism	by	asserting	that	the	objects	of	knowledge	are	given	to	us	in	blind	judgments.	Brentano	therefore	rejects	synthetic	a	priori	judgments	not	because	they	are	a	priori,	but	because	their	correctness	cannot	be	“seen”	–	i.e.,	because	they	are	“blind.”	For	him,	accepting	blind	judgments	(blinde	Vorurteile)	as	the	basis	of	our	knowledge,	and	establishing	the	existence	of	God,	the	immortality	of	the	soul	and	free	will	as	postulates	of	practical	pure	reason,	is	a	symptom	of	the	utmost	decay.40	Brentano	spent	considerable	energy	arguing	against	all	aspects	of	Kantian	philosophy,	for	instance	in	a	posthumously	published	work	against	Kant	written	in	1903	and	entitled	“Down	with	Prejudices!	A	Warning	to	the	Present	in	the	Spirit	of	Bacon	and	Descartes	to	Free	Itself	from	All	Blind	A	Prioris.”41	Even	the	construction	of	his	lectures	on	metaphysics	from	1867/68	is	utterly	anti-Kantian:	he	begins,	as	Kant	does	in	the	
Critique	of	Pure	Reason,	with	the	“transcendental	philosophy,”	but	concludes	this	opening	section	in	direct	opposition	to	Kant:		We	have	concluded	our	apology	of	what	Kant	would	have	called	the	transcendental	part	of	metaphysics.	We	now	proceed	to	investigate	what	might	be	called,	in	his	language,	transcendent.	He	stops	here.	From	the	standpoint	of	his	conclusions,	he	forbids	us	to	carry	on.	However,	his	conclusion	is	not	ours.	He	ends	up	with	a	skeptical	attitude	[that	maintains]	the	unknowability	of	the	thing	in	itself	and	the	subjectivity	of	our	principles.	We,	in	contrast,	have	seen	that	we	do	have	indubitable	principles.42			
Principle	(c):	Empiricism	As	in	the	case	of	principle	(a),	the	general	principle	(c)	has	two	different	domains	of	application	in	Brentano’s	philosophy.	In	metaphysics,	his	empiricism	takes	the	form	of	a	critique	of	skepticism	towards	the	possibility	of	knowledge	and	of	a	rejection	of	dogmatism.	Brentano	argues	for	two	kinds	of	immediately	evident	knowledge:																																																										
39 See Brentano (1926/1998, p. 26/99). 
40 Brentano (1926, p. 22) 
41 In Brentano (1925). 
42 Quoted and translated in Baumgartner (2013, p. 233). 
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1) axioms,	which	include	tautologies,	universal	predications	(e.g.,	“red	is	a	color”),	predications	of	a	basis	for	some	being	(e.g.,	“everything	which	is	colored	is	extended”),	the	truth	of	a	correlative	(e.g.,	“if	a	is	bigger	than	b,	then	b	is	smaller	than	a”),	mereological	truths	(e.g.,	“if	a	lion	exists,	then	the	heart	of	a	lion	exists”,	or	“if	there	is	a	body,	there	is	a	surface”),	the	determinateness	of	that	which	is	incompletely	presented	(e.g.,	“a	color	is	either	red,	blue,	white,	etc.”),	essential	relations	(e.g.,	“10	metres	is	twice	as	long	as	5	metres”),	the	necessity	of	a	position,	form,	or	ordering	in	a	continuum	(e.g.,	“3	p.m.	is	earlier	than	4	p.m.),	and	double	negation.43	2) Inner	perceivings	(e.g.,	the	knowledge	that	I	am	presently	hearing	(when	I	do),	the	knowledge	that	I	want	to	sleep	(when	I	do),	etc.).	Metaphysics	is	not	only	based	on	immediate	evident	knowledge,	but	also	on	mediate	(and	thus	only	probable)	knowledge,	which	is	obtained	through	induction	from	repeated	observations.	This	kind	of	knowledge	is	what	Brentano	calls	a	“physical	certainty”	of	what	is	given	in	external	perception.	Being	built	on	these	two	sources	of	immediate	evident	knowledge	and	on	the	“physical	certainty”	of	mediate	knowledge	of	outer	perception	secures	the	empirical	grounds	of	metaphysics.	Of	course,	physical	certainty	is	not	evidence:	this	is	why	the	beings	Brentano	investigates	are	not	simply	the	table	out	there,	and	also	not	the	“things	heard”	or	the	“things	seen,”	but	rather	the	“hearer-of-a-tone”	or	the	“seer-of-a-bird.”	Only	in	this	form	are	substances	accessible	to	inner	perception.44			 The	second	domain	of	application	of	principle	(c)	is	psychology	per	se.	For	Brentano,	psychology	relies	on	the	same	two	sources	of	knowledge	as	metaphysics:	“physical	certainty”	obtained	by	induction	from	observation	via	outer	perception,	and	evident	knowledge,	based	either	on	inner	perception	or	on	the	self-evidence	of	axioms.	Psychology	is	therefore	an	empirical	science	with	respect	to	the	laws	of	succession	between	phenomena,	the	explanation	of	their	causes,	and	the	prediction	of	further	phenomena	–	which	are	laws	obtained	by	induction	–	but	also	regarding	innerly		perceived	phenomena,	which	are	subject	to	self-evident	laws.		
Principle	(d):	The	mereological	nature	of	substance																																																									
43 See Brentano (1867b: 31766). 
44 Smith (1987) aptly calls Brentano’s beings “augmented substances.” 
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As	we	have	seen	above,	Brentano	defends	a	conception	of	beings	as	substances	that	are	augmented	by	their	attributes	or	accidents.	There	are	no	isolated	substances:	substances	are	not	separable	from	their	accidents.	Rather,	substances	with	their	accidents,	that	which	he	also	calls	“things,”	are	to	be	taken	as	metaphysical	wholes.		 This	conception	of	substances	as	wholes	is		called	a	“mereological”	conception,	with	reference	to	Twardowski’s	student	Leśniewski,	who	coined	this	name	for	the	theory	of	the	formal	relations	between	a	whole	and	its	parts.	The	basic	principle	(d)	is	supported	by	Brentano’s	homonymic	reading	of	Aristotle’s	concept	of	being.	In	Brentano’s	view,	all	senses	of	Being	–	being	in	the	sense	of	accidental	being,	in	the	sense	of	the	true,	in	the	sense	of	being	possible	and	in	the	sense	of	the	categories	–	are	derivative	from	the	fundamental	meaning	of	being	according	to	the	categories.45	To	put	it	differently,	the	first	substance	is	included	in	the	focal	meaning	of	all	the	ways	in	which	we	speak	of	being,	all	of	which	express	“modes	of	existence	in	the	first	substance”	(Brentano	1862/1975:	178/118).46		 Principle	(d)	suggests,	in	the	line	of	Aquinas	and	Aristotle,	that	accidentis	esse	est	
inesse,	i.e.,	that	the	being	of	accidents	is	an	inexistence	(inwohnen)	in	the	substance.	“The	substance	which	has	a	quality	is	neither	the	quality	nor	the	possessing	of	the	quality,	but	still	the	possessing	of	the	quality	is	not	for	the	substance	a	further	quality.	Rather,	the	possessing	of	a	quality	is	essentially	identical	with	the	substance”	(See	Brentano	1867b:	31792).47	In	his	1874	Psychology,	Brentano	steps	back	on	this	mereological	relation	of	
inwohnen	and	characterizes	intentionality	as	the	‘inwohnen’	of	an	object	in	a	mental	act.			
Principle	(e):	the	correctness	principle		Brentano’s	conception	of	value	in	terms	of	desire-worthiness	(1866)	or	love-worthiness	(1889)	is	already	set	out	as	one	of	the	25	theses	in	1866.	Although	some	elements	of	the	theory	are	present	in	his	Vienna	lectures	on	practical	philosophy,48	the	account	was	first	presented	in	print	in	1889:	“We	call	something	good,	if	love	of	it	is	correct.	What	is	to	be	loved	with	correct	love,	what	is	worthy	of	love,	is	the	good	in	the	widest	sense.”	(Brentano	1889:	17,	translation	modified).	This	is	the	basic	fitting	attitude	account	of																																																									
45 Brentano relies here on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 1003b6-10. 
46 On this interpretation of Brentano’s reading of Aristotle’s homonymic conception of being as substance, see 
for instance Owen (1960) and Shields (1999:217ff). 
47 The same idea is discussed in Brentano’s first project of a PhD dissertation on Suarez from the early 1860s. 
See Brentano (frühe Schriften: 1000054)). 
48 Brentano (1952/1973). 
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value	that	Brentano	proposed	–	years	before	Ewing	(1947)	and	Scanlon	(1998)	–	in	which	evaluative	categories	are	accounted	for	in	terms	of	deontic	categories.	Brentano	defended	two	variants	of	the	theory.	According	to	the	first	(Brentano	1889;	Brentano	1930),	some	of	our	emotions	are	correct	because	they	are	in	harmony	with	the	value	of	the	object	(Brentano	1930:25).	The	second	view	has	sometimes	been	characterized	as	the	orthonomy	view	(Kraus	1937):	to	say	that	our	emotions	are	correct	is	just	to	say	that	they	are	experienced	or	known		as	correct	(Brentano	uses	here	“characterized	as	correct”,	als	richtig	charakterisiert).49	In	this	context,	love	is	a	higher	mode	of	taking	pleasure	in	something.50		It	should	be	added	also	that	principle	(e)	holds	not	only	for	emotions,	but	also	for	judgments.	The	judgment	expressed	by	“a	exists”	is	true,	Brentano	argues,	if	and	only	if	acknowledging	(anerkennen)	the	existence	of	a	is	correct.51	We	will	return	to	the	correctness	principle	in	section	3	below.		
3. The	phenomenology	of	Brentano	and	Husserl	Despite	the	variety	of	stances	which	Brentano	expressed	on	ontology,	metaphysics,	and	psychology	over	the	course	of	his	career,	these	five	principles	remain	central	to	his	whole	philosophy	throughout:	they	have	an	important	place	in	what	could	be	called	Brentano’s	philosophical	worldview	or	system.52	By	extension,	they	also	are	essential	to	his	conception	of	phenomenology.	Since	Husserl’s	phenomenology	grew	out	of	Brentanian	soil	–	although	other	influences,	from	Bolzano	and	Frege,	are	essential	to	understanding	its	specificities	(see	below)	–	let	us	now	turn	to	the	central	issues	in	the	two	thinkers’	accounts	of	phenomenology,	and	to	their	respective	applications	of	the	principles	mentioned	above.		
Phenomenology,	Phenomena,	and	Experiences	Brentano	introduced	phenomenology	as	a	philosophical	discipline	in	his	first	lectures	on	metaphysics	in	Vienna	in	1877/78.53	He	first	used	the	term	‘phenomenology’	to	characterize	research	into	the	contents	of	mental	states,	only	later	(in	Vienna)	expanding	the	lexicon	of	the	discipline	with	the	expressions	“descriptive	psychology,”																																																									
49 Brentano (1889/1902, p. 19-20/18). 
50 On Brentano’s orthonomy view, see Kraus (1937, pp. 165ff) and Mulligan (forthcoming). 
51 On Brentano’s theory of judgment, see Brandl (2014). 
52 On Brentano’s worldview, see Fréchette (forthcoming-a). On Brentano’s philosophical system, see Kriegel 
(forthcoming). 
53 See Masaryk’s notes on Brentano’s metaphysics lectures in Masaryk (1877/78), where phenomenology is 
described as a “part of metaphysics.”  
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“psychognosy,”	or	“phenomenognosy.”	As	a	part	of	metaphysics,	phenomenology	was	then	introduced	as	a	form	of	investigation	that	precedes	ontology	but	follows	the	so-called	“transcendental	philosophy,”	the	part	of	metaphysics	that	deals	with	skepticism	and	the	arguments	against	it.	In	this	context,	phenomenology	was	introduced	as	an	“investigation	on	the	contents	of	our	presentations”	(Brentano	1867b:	31739),	dealing	with	the	ways	substance	appears,	in	opposition	to	the	ways	substance	is.			 The	motivation	behind	Brentano’s	introduction	of	phenomenology	as	a	sort	of	preliminary	to	ontology	is	not	very	well	documented.	Whewell’s	(1847)	History	of	
Inductive	Sciences	made	a	strong	impression	on	the	young	Brentano,	and	may	have	influenced	him	in	this	context.54	Notably,	Whewell’s	proposed	distinction	between	explicative-causal	(ætiological)	and	descriptive	(phenomenological)	sciences	is	palpable	in	Brentano’s	early	manuscripts	on	the	classification	of	the	sciences.55	This	distinction	also	played	a	role	later	on,	in	Brentano’s	explanation	of	the	role	of	descriptive	psychology	in	his	Viennese	lectures,	when	he	used	an	analogy	with	the	distinction	between	geognosy	and	geology	to	illustrate	the	distinction	between	phenomenology	and	psychology	more	generally.56	Introducing	phenomenology	into	metaphysics	allows	Brentano	to	distinguish	a	field	of	investigation	on	the	ways	substance	appears,	as	opposed	to	the	ways	substance	is	(ontology).	Principles	(a)	and	(c)	in	particular	establish	the	possibility	of	a	scientific	investigation	of	phenomena	as	the	first	step	in	gaining	knowledge	of	the	nature	of	substance.	This	also	follows	from	principle	(d),	insofar	as	we	have	intuitions	of	individual	substances	only	through	their	perceived	accidents.	In	this	sense,	phenomenology	is	not	simply	a	preliminary	to	ontology,	but	also	provides	it	with	its	tools	of	analysis	and	its	epistemic	security.	As	inner	perception,	which	is	phenomenology’s	field	of	investigation,	shows	us	mental	phenomena	as	really	existing,	so	is	the	existence	of	their	parts,	especially	the	logical	and	metaphysical	parts,	also	
																																																								
54 Brentano had an annotated copy of the History of Inductive Sciences in his library, as well Mill’s book on 
Comte (Mill 1868) in a French translation.  
55 See for instance Brentano (EL75, 12921–12), where the distinction between descriptive (beschreibende) and 
causal (nach Wirkungen) sciences. This distinction also played a central role in Schlöder (1852), another work 
that the young Brentano received as a prize and annotated. The distinction between the science of objects and the 
science of phenomena is discussed in Schlöder (1852, xxv); Brentano refers to it in the aforementioned 
manuscript.  
56 See Brentano (1982/1995, p. 6/7-8) and Brentano (1895, p. 34). 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secured	by	inner	perception.57	Phenomenology	therefore	makes	authentic	metaphysical	knowledge	possible.	The	introduction	of	phenomenology	into	metaphysics	coincides	more	or	less	with	Brentano’s	more	intensive	research	in	psychology,	and	as	such	is	an	application	of	principle	(d)	to	the	empirical	study	of	the	mind.	Psychology	as	a	science	of	the	mind	investigates	nothing	other	than	the	qualities	of	the	substance,	i.e.,	in	this	specific	case,	the	qualities	of	soul.	This	is	also	why	Brentano	often	speaks	positively	of	Lange’s	“psychology	without	a	soul,”58	although	for	him	it	merely	means	that	psychology	can	only	investigate	the	phenomena	through	which	the	soul	is	given	to	us	–	what	Brentano	calls	psychical	phenomena,	which	are	only	perceivable	innerly.	But	psychology	is	not	only	an	investigation	of	soul	through	its	phenomena:	it	also	involves	a	study	of	their	origins	and	their	succession,	an	explanation	of	their	causes,	and	the	prediction	of	further	phenomena.	This	part	of	the	psychological	investigation	is	what	Brentano	sometimes	calls	“genetic	psychology.”	Since	the	causes	of	phenomena,	their	succession,	and	their	prediction	involve	physical	processes	existing	in	the	natural	world,	psychology	must	follow	the	same	methods	as	natural	sciences:	observation,	deduction,	and	induction,	insofar	as	they	are	applicable	to	the	objects	of	their	investigation,	as	formulated	in	principle	(a).	Psychology,	and	more	particularly	genetic	psychology,	is	therefore	involved	with	the	same	phenomena	as	the	natural	sciences.	These	are	called	physical	
phenomena.	Here	we	see	the	full	consequences	of	thesis	4:	a	subset	of	philosophy	(which	includes	metaphysics	and	psychology)	shares	the	same	objects	as	the	natural	sciences	(physical	phenomena)	and	must	therefore	apply	the	same	methods	to	their	investigation.	Within	this	strict	framework,	Brentano	considers	psychical	phenomena	the	main	object	of	the	part	of	psychology	he	calls	phenomenology	or	descriptive	psychology.	What	are	the	essential	features	of	psychical	phenomena?	After	all,	a	natural	scientist,	or	physiologist,	could	well	argue	that	they	are	reducible	to	physical	phenomena.	This	is	one																																																									
57 See Brentano (1867a: 31739): “When it is formulated in general, the question of the existence of realities 
belongs to ontology. If we would call everything that is not intentional an external thing, the question of the 
existence of external things would be the first question of ontology. But this is not the usage. We do not use to 
call our own mental phenomena in this way... The question about what is real is thereby already partially 
answered. The existence of phenomena of inner perception, and thereby the existence of their parts, in particular 
of the logical and metaphysical parts“. 
58 Brentano (1874/2015, p. 27/22). 
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of	Brentano’s	most	patent	concerns	in	his	Psychology,	and	it	is	also	the	motivation	behind	his	arguments	on	the	irreducibility	of	the	mental	to	the	physical.	He	offers	different	arguments	–	on	the	absence	of	extension	of	psychical	phenomena,	on	their	inner	perceivability,	and	so	on.	But	what	he	considers	to	be	the	“most	excellent”	trait	of	mental	phenomena	over	physical	phenomena	is	their	intentionality,	i.e.,	the	fact	that	they	are	directed	toward	something	as	their	object.		In	Husserl’s	view,	it	was	this	feature	of	psychical	phenomena	that	was	the	most	important.	Early	enough,	however,	Husserl	was	dissatisfied	with	Brentano’s	concept	of	psychical	phenomena.	His	main	concern	was	that	calling	both	these	mental	acts	and	their	objects	“phenomena”	is	misleading,	since	it	gives	the	impression	that	the	apparent	things	(e.g.,	the	red	spot	I	am	seeing)	“only	appear	as	analogues	of	sensations”	(Husserl	1901a/2001:	235/342),	and	not	as	properties	of	the	corresponding	objects.	Husserl	did	not	formally	accuse	Brentano	of	this	confusion,	but	his	way	of	avoiding	the	confusion	is	also	a	rejection	of	Brentano’s	view:		“If	an	external	object	(a	house)	is	perceived,	presenting	sensations	are	experienced	in	this	perception,	but	they	are	not	perceived.	When	we	are	deluded	regarding	the	existence	of	the	house,	we	are	not	deluded	regarding	the	existence	of	our	experienced	sense-contents,	since	we	do	not	pass	judgment	on	them	at	all,	do	not	perceive	them	in	this	perception	(Husserl	1901a/2001,	pp.	237/344-5).		Therefore,	we	should	distinguish	between	my	experiencing	(Erleben)	of	sense-contents	(my	having	physical	phenomena)	and	my	perceiving	the	house.	The	color	spots	I	am	experiencing	may	be	called	physical	phenomena,	but	it	would	be	wrong,	according	to	Husserl,	to	call	such	an	experience	a	perception,	and	a	fortiori	a	delusive	perception.	Although	experience	may	involve	position	taking	(Wahr-Nehmung),	the	position	taking	is	not	constitutive	of	what	an	experience	(Erlebnis)	is.59	At	least	since	Gadamer	(1985,	pp.	157ff)	and	Heidegger,	the	conceptual	history	of	
Erlebnis	has	usually	been	traced	back	to	Dilthey	and	the	philosophy	of	life	(Lebensphilosophie),	a	movement	to	which	the	early	Husserl	has	been	associated.60	In	fact	however,	Husserl’s	term,	concept	and	use	of	Erlebnis,	or	das	Erlebte,	was	already																																																									
59 Husserl’s concept of experience is in some way similar to Dretske’s “non-epistemic seeing” (Dretske 1969), 
since these two concepts describe a level of sensory experience which doesn’t involve conceptual structure. 
However, contra Dretske, Husserl rejects the idea that epistemic seeing is only a“seeing that”. 
60 On similar views, see Cohen and Moran (2012, p. 195) and Carr (2014, pp. 20ff) 
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present	in	Brentano’s	lectures	on	psychology	in	1887	and	1891.	A	discussion	of	the	experienced	(das	Erlebte)	can	be	found	in	the	few	pages	of	Husserl’s	notes	on	this	lectures	which	are	still	extant.61	The	basic	reason	for	Husserl’s	preference	for	Erlebnisse	over	phenomena	is	to	avoid	the	confusion	between	two	kinds	of	phenomena,	physical	and	psychical,	considered	as	the	respective	objects	of	two	kinds	of	perception,	outer	and	inner,	where	only	the	former	can	lead	to	delusion.	Up	to	this	point,	Brentano	would	still	agree.	The	difference	is	that	for	Husserl,	perceiving	is	not	experiencing:	perception	involves	interpretation	(Auffassung),	whereas	experiencing	is	just	access	to	sensory	data	prior	to	any	interpretation.	Brentano	indeed	often	seems	to	overlook	this	difference,	since	for	him	experiencing	is	perceiving,	and	perception	itself	is	a	judgment	and	therefore	a	position-taking.	Furthermore,	Husserl's	use	of	the	broader	concept	of	Erlebnisse,	instead	of	the	narrower	concept	of	mental	phenomena,	allows	him	to	isolate	a	category	of	mental	acts	which	are	not	intentional.	Distinguishing	between	experiencing	and	perceiving	allows	him	to	reserve	intentionality	for	perceptions	and	for	some	lived	experiences.	For	Husserl,	intentionality	is	not	the	mark	of	lived	experiences.		
Description	and	its	tools	
Exactness.	Brentano’s	descriptive	psychology	and	Husserl’s	phenomenology	have	in	common	the	search	for	exactness,	both	in	the	descriptions	themselves	and	in	the	analysis	used.	Brentano’s	descriptive	psychology	lectures,	for	instance,	develop	at	length	on	possible	arguments	in	the	debate	between	empiricism	and	nativism	on	space	perception.	Brentano	and	most	of	his	students	defended	the	nativist	account	according	to	which	space	is	not	deduced	from	experience,	but	is	a	concrete	element	of	our	experience.	This	obsession	with	exactitude	in	argumentation	and	description	is	also	attested	by	Stumpf	(1924/1930,	p.	210/394),	and	manifest	in	many	other	works	from	the	school	of	Brentano.62	Husserl	also	expresses	a	similar	concern	in	his	argument	in	the	fifth	logical	investigation	(Husserl	2001,	pp.	146-170),	in	which	he	explores	different																																																									
61 Husserl had a large collection of lecture notes from Brentano’s lectures, which he donated to the Brentano 
Society in Prague in 1930. These were obviously destroyed during the war since no traces of them are left. A 
fragment of Husserl’s lecture notes on the 1887 descriptive psychology lectures (copied from the notes of 
Schmidkunz) does give evidence of the Brentanian origin of Erlebnis and Erlebte: “When I say that descriptive 
psychology describes what is experienced in immediate experience (das in unmittelbar Erfahrung Erlebte), I am 
not talking about an enumeration of individual cases, but about what is generally characteristic about the 
elements that remain while the composition changes.” On “experiencing”, see also Brentano (1982/1995). 
62 On exactness in the School of Brentano, see Mulligan (1986). 
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alternative	interpretations	of	the	thesis	that	every	act	is	a	presentation	or	has	a	presentation	as	a	basis.	
Examples.	Another	central	element	of	the	methodology	of	descriptive	psychology	is	the	use	of	examples.	All	of	the	descriptive	cases	in	Brentano’s	descriptive	psychology	start	from	examples:	this	is	a	principle	which	Bolzano	called	an	explication	(Verständigung)	in	the	narrow	sense,	for	cases	where	a	conceptual	analysis	is	not	available.	Brentano	uses	the	same	technique	for	descriptive	psychology:			 A	very	specific	technique	[i.e.,	of	descriptive	psychology]	often	makes	it	necessary	to	bring	someone	else	to	pay	attention	to	something	which	he	at	the	outset	simply	cannot	find,	which	he	even	puts	decisively	and	literally	into	question.		1.	Demonstration	of	examples,	where	[something]	is	[there]	and	is	not.	2.	Exposition	of	the	consequences.	3.	Evidence	(Nachweis)	from	experimentations.	Furthermore,	the	technique	necessitates	a	specific	practice	(Übung)	whose	most	essential	preconditions	are	still	missing,	as	long	as	experiments	are	conducted	no	less	than	unmethodically	or	following	poor	methods.	Finally,	it	requires	in	particular	a	certain	division	of	labor,	which	is	almost	never	practiced	in	the	philosophical	domain.	(Brentano-forthcoming)	[1887:	157-8]		Husserl	too	presents	phenomenology	as	a	philosophy	that	begins	with	examples.	Large	parts	of	the	Logical	Investigations	are	built	on	what	Husserl	calls	“analyses	of	examples”	(Bespielsanalysen),	which	are	an	essential	part	of	any	argument.	This	practice	is	drawn	directly	from	Brentano’s	descriptive	psychology.	In	the	preface	to	his	Philosophy	of	
Arithmetics	for	instance,	Husserl	stresses	the	fact	that	he	does	not	use	any	terminology	which	is	not	introduced	by	examples	or	definitions.63		
Eidetic	variations:	Eidetic	variations	build	on	the	Beispielsanalysen:	their	aim,	in	Husserl’s	method,	is	to	gain	knowledge	of	necessities.	For	example,	seeing	a	white	coffee	cup,	we	may	ask	“What	holds	up	amid	such	free	variations	of	an	original…as	the	invariant,	the	necessary,	universal	form,	the	essential	form,	without	which	something	of	that	kind…	would	be	altogether	inconceivable?”	(Husserl	1962/1977,	p.	72/54).	At	some	point,	in	imaginatively	varying	the	coffee	cup,	we	come	up	with	features	that	cannot	be																																																									
63 Husserl (1891/2003, p. VII/6): “I have made sparse use of philosophical terminology, which is rather 
indeterminate in any case. In particular, I have used no terms not sufficiently clarified through definition or 
examples.” 
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varied	without	making	the	object	itself	inconceivable	(as	a	coffee	cup),	e.g.,	that	it	is	not	a	receptacle	for	liquid.	Husserl’s	use	of	what	he	calls	eidetic	variations	is	reminiscent	of	Bolzano’s	use	of	the	logic	of	variation	in	his	Wissenschaftslehre	(Bolzano	1837/2014),	a	book	Husserl	knew	very	well.		
Reduction:	In	fact,	when	Husserl	first	introduced	the	phenomenological	reduction	in	a	Seefeld	manuscript	from	1905,	he	began	with	the	example	of	a	beer	bottle:			 “I	see	a	beer	bottle	that	is	brown,	and	I	restrict	myself	to	the	brown	in	its	extension,	‘just	as	it	is	actually	given’…	I	perceive	–	this	brown	content.	It	is	
something	that	endures.	It	is	constantly	the	same.	It	covers	a	certain	phenomenological	extension.	I	saw	it	yesterday;	I	remember	it	today.	It	has	lasted	until	today.	Transcendence!”	(Husserl	1966/1991,	p.	238/245-246).			For	Husserl,	the	focus	on	what	is	“actually	given,”	bracketing	all	further	assumptions	on	the	nature	or	existence	of	the	objects	perceived,	has	the	function	of	neutralizing	our	dogmatic	attitude	towards	reality	–	what	he	also	calls	a	naïve	metaphysical	attitude	–	in	order	to	make	us	aware	of	our	active	contributions	in	our	commerce	with	the	world,	as	in	our	apprehension	of	objects.	Bracketing	the	natural	attitude	towards	the	beer	bottle	allows	us	to	“see”	how	this	object	is	constituted	through	meaning-bestowing	acts,	i.e.,	how	its	“sense”	(Sinn)	is	constituted,	and	how	this	sense	determines	our	apprehension	of	the	object.		 After	1913	Husserl	developed	this	idea	in	detail	in	vast	analyses	of	how	the	most	diverse	aspects	of	reality	are	constituted:	meaning,	time-consciousness,	the	experienced	body,	intersubjectivity	and	intersubjective	reality,	and	even	the	world	itself	as	we	experience	it:	our	life-world	(Lebenswelt).		 The	mechanism	at	work,	the	“bracketing”	that	is	characteristic	of	the	phenomenological	reduction	in	the	works	that	Husserl	published	after	1913,	is	at	bottom	quite	similar	to	the	stance	he	defended	in	the	Logical	Investigations,	and	which	he	called	there	the	“metaphysical	neutrality”	of	phenomenology.	In	this	context,	he	argued	that	questions	concerning	the	possibility	of	knowledge	or	on	whether	there	is	an	external	reality	should	be	rejected	as	metaphysical	questions,	which	have	no	place	in	
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phenomenology	(see	for	instance	1901/2001a,	p.	26/pp.	177-8).	Many	other	similar	affirmations	can	be	found	throughout	the	Logical	Investigations.64	Like	phenomenological	reduction,	metaphysical	neutrality	is	a	methodological	device	which	defines	the	domain	of	phenomenological	research,	namely	“phenomena”:	i.e.,	what	is	directly	given	to	us.	In	both	cases,	we	refrain	from	metaphysical	assumptions	on	the	nature	of	perceived	colors,	tones,	and	even	on	the	nature	or	existence	of	consciousness.			 Despite	this	important	similarity,	phenomenological	reduction	differs	in	two	fundamental	aspects	from	the	stance	of	metaphysical	neutrality.	First,	the	former	is	a	generalization	of	the	latter,	which	ranges	not	only	over	the	objects	of	perception,	but	over	all	possible	objects	tout	court.	Second,	while	metaphysical	neutrality	is	a	descriptivist	stance	–	it	aims	only	to	provide	a	phenomenologically	plausible	analysis	of	our	experiences	and	their	contents	–	the	motivation	behind	phenomenological	reduction	is	foundational,	which	makes	it	a	typical	idealist	(and	neo-Kantian)	device:	it	aims	to	isolate	the	conditions	of	possibility	of	things	“just	as	they	are	actually	given.”		In	a	Kantian-Cartesian	fashion,	Husserl	comes	to	the	conclusion	in	the	Ideas	that	since	I	cannot	imagine	the	world	being	annihilated	without	imagining	being	myself	conscious	of	this	annihilation,	then	subjectivity	must	be	considered	as	the	condition	of	possibility	for	the	appearance	of	the	world.	This	is	Husserl’s	‘discovery	of	the	I,’	which	provides	the	foundational	basis	of	his	analysis	of	constitution.	65				 There	is	no	consensus	on	how	exactly	the	significance	of	the	foundationalist	project	Husserl	pursued	in	the	Ideas	should	be	understood.	After	the	publication	of	the	
Ideas	in	1913,	Husserl’s	own	students	and	close	collaborators	and	colleagues	–	Adolf	Reinach,	Johannes	Daubert,	Max	Scheler,	Theodor	Conrad,	Alexander	Pfänder,	Edith	Stein,	Jean	Héring,	Moritz	Geiger,	and	Roman	Ingarden	(to	name	only	a	few)	–	reacted	in	different	ways	to	Husserl’s	foundationalist	project,	but	in	general	they	had	one	of	two	reactions:	either	they	dismissed	it	as	a	whole	or	they	remained	indifferent,	considering	it	as	an	optional	and	therefore	inessential	way	of	understanding	phenomenological	analysis.	Although	some	of	Husserl’s	later	students	in	Freiburg	were	sympathetic	to	the	foundationalist	project	–	among	them	Jan	Patocka,	Eugen	Fink,	Alfred	Schütz,	Ludwig	Landgrebe,	and	Theodor	Celms	–	the	project	itself	only	survived	Husserl’s	death	in	the	
																																																								
64 See also 1901/2001a: pp. 6/166, 129/249, 201/296; 1901/2001: pp. 401/106, 413/113, 729/317, 732/319. 
65 Relevant passages on the reduction are to be found in Husserl (1913/1983, pp. 61-62/68-70; 73-74/85-87; 202-
204/236-239). 
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form	of	the	Gabelsberger	manuscripts,	which	have	been	progressively	published	since	the	1950s.	Even	today,	after	more	than	60	years	of	intensive	publication	of	Husserl’s	manuscripts,	there	is	still	no	consensus	on	the	nature	of	the	project.	One	widespread	interpretation	among	Husserl	scholars	has	it	that	the	project	is	fully	foundationalist	and	that	phenomenological	reduction	is	in	essence	a	refined	device	for	transcendental	idealism,	which	gives	phenomenological	descriptions	their	validity	for	knowledge.	Another	interpretation,	inspired	by	Føllesdal	(1969)	and	developed	further	by	Smith	and	MacIntyre	(1982),	is	similar	in	spirit	to	the	‘indifferent’	reaction	of	early	phenomenologists:	either	with	or	without	foundationalist	concerns,	phenomenology	essentially	gives	a	theory	of	our	meaning-bestowing	activities.	Therefore,	the	foundationalist	project	is	optional.			
Intentionality	These	two	takes	on	the	foundationalist	project	of	post-1913	phenomenology	are	best	illustrated	by	the	different	conceptions	of	intentionality,	intentional	object,	and	intentional	content	which	have	been	defended	by	phenomenologists	since	then.	Here,	Brentano’s	theory	of	intentionality	is	of	central	importance.	This	theory	is	one	of	the	most	lasting	influences	of	his	thought,	not	only	on	Austro-German	philosophy	in	general,	but	also	on	20th-century	philosophy,	both	in	the	post-Husserlian	phenomenological	tradition	and	in	analytic	philosophy.		
	
The	basic	theory	of	intentionality.	Brentano	proposed	many	different	descriptions	of	intentionality.	Common	to	all	of	them	is	the	claim	that	intentionality	is	a	characteristic	property	of	something	mental	(an	act,	or	a	subject	in	the	reistic	phase),	which	serves	as	a	means	to	classify	what	belongs	to	the	domain	of	the	mental	and	what	to	the	domain	of	the	physical.	This	characteristic	property	is	what	Brentano	also	calls	“direction	towards	an	object”	or	the	“immanent	objectivity”	of	an	act,	which	makes	the	basic	theory	a	relational	theory	of	intentionality.	However,	these	two	further	appellations	do	not	help	much,	since	they	seem	to	point	at	features	that	are	not	obviously	identical:	the	fact	that	intentionality	is	aboutness	–	e.g.,	desiring	an	ice	cream	is	an	intentional	state	which	is	about	an	ice	cream	–	and	the	fact	that	the	object	of	an	intentional	act	is	“contained”	or	“intentionally	inexists”	in	the	act.	In	fact	these	two	features	do	not	even	seem	to	be	compatible,	at	least	prima	facie:	if	my	desiring	an	ice	
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cream	is	intentional	and	if	intentional	objects	are	contained	in	the	act,	it	seems	that	I	cannot	reasonably	desire	an	ice	cream	if	the	ice	cream	is	already	‘contained’	in	my	act.		 It	has	been	usual	since	Chisholm	(1957,	p.	169)	to	consider	these	two	appellations	as	expressions	of	one	and	the	same	feature.	On	Chisholm’s	reading,	Brentano	is	committed	to	the	view	that	intentional	objects	are	some	kind	of	intra-mental	entities	enjoying	some	diminished	kind	of	existence.		In	this	case,	my	desiring	an	ice	cream	has	an	intentional	object,	the	“ice	cream	represented	and	desired,”	which	is	distinct	from	the	dairy	product	that	I	may	subsequently	enjoy.66		 It	is	questionable,	however,	whether	the	account	of	Brentano’s	concept	of	intentionality	that	Chisholm	sketches	is	a	faithful	reconstruction	of	Brentano’s	ideas	about	intentionality.	To	be	sure,	Brentano	himself	is	not	very	careful	in	his	description	of	intentionality	in	the	Psychology	from	an	Empirical	Standpoint	(1874/2015,	p.	106/92-93),	where	“content”	and	“object”	are	used	interchangeably.	This	may	be	explained	in	many	ways.	Perhaps	the	most	important	to	mention	is	that	the	ontology	of	intentionality	is	not	Brentano’s	primary	concern	in	the	Psychology:	he	focuses	instead	on	the	dualism	of	the	mental	and	the	physical	that	intentionality	grounds,	and	with	the	task	of	psychology	as	a	science	of	phenomena.	In	the	latter	case,	it	indeed	makes	no	important	difference	whether	the	phenomena	described	are	called	“contents”	or	“objects,”	since	they	are	simply	phenomena.	This	is	why,	in	this	context,	the	ontological	implications	of	intentionality	play	no	significant	role	in	the	project	conducted	in	the	Psychology.		 Despite	its	apparent	limitations	and	the	mainly	psychological	motivations	behind	the	basic	theory,	it	has	the	advantage	of	ranging	over	all	mental	phenomena	and	explaining	their	common	core,	notwithstanding	the	fact	that	we	sometimes	make	perceptual	errors	or	think	of	objects	which	do	not	exist.	This	advantage	should	not	be	underestimated,	as	it	allows	Brentano	to	offer	an	account	of	the	intentional	nature	of	our	phenomenal	experiences.	What	it’s	like	for	me	to	enjoy	an	ice	cream	is	something	which,	on	the	face	of	it,	does	not	have	much	to	do	with	a	state	of	the	world,	and	yet	it	seems	that	the	experience	of	tasting	an	ice	cream	has	an	intentional	object	which	is	the	content	of	the	experience,	its	phenomenal	features,	which	seem	to	be	distinct	from	the	physical	properties	of	the	dairy	product	perched	on	the	cone	in	my	hand.	This	is	the	gist	of	the	formulation	we	find	in	Psychology	from	an	Empirical	Standpoint	concerning	the	contents	
																																																								
66 Chisholm (1967, p. 201); (1960, pp. 4-5.) I argue against this account in Fréchette (2013) and (2016a).  
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of	experience,	i.e.,	physical	phenomena:	“Knowledge,	joy,	desire,	exist	actually;	colour,	tone,	warmth	only	phenomenally	and	intentionally.”		 		
The	enhanced	theory.	The	basic	theory	offers	a	unified	relational	account	of	intentionality	which	takes	seriously	the	fact	that	our	experience	has	phenomenal	content	that	is	constitutive	of	the	intentionality	of	our	acts.	However,	it	does	not	say	much	about	experiences	which	are	not	strictly	sensory	experiences.	My	disappointment	about	winter	coming	too	soon	is	clearly	linked	in	a	significant	way	to	sensory	contents,	but	such	contents	are	obviously	not	all	there	is	to	say	about	the	content	of	my	disappointment.	The	basic	theory	displays	a	similar	shortcoming	with	regard	to	judgment,	e.g.,	my	act	of	meaning	as	expressed	by	“2+2=4”.		 In	the	Psychology	of	1874,	such	cases	were	presented	as	more	or	less	analogous	to	sensory	experiences,	leaving	many	questions	open	as	to	how	abstract	presentational	contents	or	the	contents	of	emotions	and	judgments	are	to	be	considered	in	some	important	sense	as	sensory	and	yet	constituted	through	acts	which	are	essentially	distinct	from	sensings.67	Brentano	considered	these	cases	in	more	detail	in	his	lectures	on	logic	in	the	1870s	and	1880s,	and	also	in	his	lectures	on	descriptive	psychology	in	the	1880s	and	1890s.	At	least	for	the	case	of	acts	of	meaning,	but	plausibly	for	all	mental	acts,	he	proposes	an	alternative	account	of	the	intentional	relation.	Since	these	texts	are	still	unpublished,	it	may	be	worth	quoting	some	of	the	passages	detailing	his	account	of	acts	of	meaning	at	length	here:		 Like	names,	assertions	too	have	a	double	reference: (a)	to	the	content	of	a	psychical	phenomenon	as	such;	(b)	to	a	putative	external	object.	The	first	is	the	meaning.	(EL80:	61-62)….	The	name	manifests	a	mental	phenomenon,	[it]	means	[bedeutet]	the	content	of	a	presentation	as	such	(the	immanent	object?),	[and]	it	names	that	which	is	presented	through	the	content	of	a	presentation.	We	say	about	this:	the	name	is	attributed	to	it.	What	one	names	are	the	real	objects	of	the	presentation	which	–	if	they	exist,	are	the	external	objects	of	the	presentation.	(One	names	through	the	mediation	of	meaning)	(EL81:13528)…	I	call	the	presented	as	presented	the	
content	of	the	presentation.	I	call	object	of	the	presentation	the	presented	under	the	guise	through	which	it	is	presented	(if	it	exists).	There	always	is	a	content	when	something	is	presented.	But	the	presentation	often	lacks	an	object.	Many	different	objects	can	correspond	to	one	single	content	of	presentation.	And	one	single	object	can	correspond	to	many	different	contents	of	presentation	(PS48)….	The	name	…	expresses	the	presentation	in	such	a	way	that	it	names	that	which	is	presented	by																																																									
67 Brentano and his early students – Stumpf and Marty – made many attempts in lectures and correspondence to 
account for this fact, particularly through sophisticated conceptions of abstraction. See Fréchette (2015a) and 
(forthcoming-b) on these various attempts. 
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the	presentation,	and	it	names	it	under	its	mediation	and	for	this	reason	completely	or	incompletely	determined	(or	undetermined)	in	the	same	way	as	it	presents	it.	In	this	way,	the	presentation	is	the	sense	(Sinn)	of	the	name;	the	thing	is	that	which	is	named	by	the	name	and	in	the	most	proper	sense	that	which	is	designated	through	it…(EL72,	12578-9).		It	is	thus	fair	to	suppose	that	the	basic	account	was	not	Brentano’s	last	word	on	intentionality.	Between	the	1870s	and	the	beginning	of	the	20th	century,	Brentano	developed	the	enhanced	view	that	at	least	some	mental	acts,	namely	meaning	acts,	involve	a	distinction	between	the	content	and	the	object	of	the	presentation,	the	judgment,	or	the	act	of	desire.	Especially	in	the	1880s	and	afterward,	this	distinction	was	popularized	in	print	by	Twardowski	(1894/1977)	and	Meinong	(1899/1978).		According	to	the	enhanced	theory,	when	I	utter	“The	Sun	exists,”	the	content	of	my	judgment	is	the	state	of	affairs,	or	the	‘Sun’s	existence,’	and	the	object	is	the	Sun.	When	I	use	the	name	“table”	to	express	some	mental	content,	this	content	is	different	than	the	object	I	am	referring	to,	since	the	object	may	or	may	not	exist,	although	the	content	(the	Presented	as	such)	necessarily	exists.		In	this	theory,	the	intentional	content	plays	the	role	of	a	mediator,	what	Brentano	calls	sometimes	a	sense	(Sinn),	sometimes	a	meaning	(Bedeutung).	Brentano’s	Sinne	are	mental	entities	of	a	special	kind:	they	mediate	objects,	more	or	less	determinately,	similarly	to	the	way	in	which	names	more	or	less	determinately	name	an	object.	The	
Sinne	are	not	the	content	of	intuitive	presentations,	since	intuitive	presentations	are	by	nature	presentations	of	fully	determinate	content.	Rather,	they	are	the	content	of	abstract	presentations.	To	some	extent,	Brentano’s	conception	of	Sinne	in	the	enhanced	theory	of	intentionality	prefigures	Frege’s	concept	of	sense	in	Frege	(1892).		
The	reistic	version.	What	kind	of	entities,	then,	are	the	physical	phenomena	(also	called	‘contents’	or	‘objects’)	according	to	the	basic	theory?	On	the	account	that	Brentano	offered	in	his	later	self-criticisms,	he	conceived	them	as	entities	with	a	lesser	kind	of	existence,	sometimes	described	as	their	“intentional	inexistence.”	On	this	view,	they	were	considered	as	irrealia,	in	opposition	to	real	existing	entities.	In	the	basic	theory,	intentionality	was	thus	a	relationship	between	a	real	entity	and	an	unreal	entity.		 Since	it	is	not	systematically	developed	in	his	manuscripts,	it	is	hard	to	see	exactly	what	kind	of	entities	stand	as	targets	in	the	enhanced	theory.	Since	Brentano	accepted	objectless	presentations	back	then,	then	it	would	make	good	sense	to	see	
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external	objects	as	the	target	of	intentional	acts,	mediated	by	the	act’s	correlate:	the	intentional	content.	But	even	in	this	case,	the	enhanced	theory	does	not	provide	a	comprehensive	account	of	intentionality,	which	would	be	relational	in	cases	of	existing	objects,	although	allowing	for	non-relational	cases,	e.g.,	in	the	cases	of	the	presentation	of	the	god	Jupiter	or	of	a	golden	mountain.68		Brentano	shifted	his	view	on	the	nature	of	intentionality	around	1904.	The	first	two	theories	described	intentionality	in	terms	of	a	two-	or	three-term	relationship.	The	last	theory,	which	is	often	called	reism,	is	based	on	the	contrary	on	the	idea	that	intentionality	is	a	special	kind	of	relation	(in	fact,	not	a	relation	in	the	proper	sense	of	the	term),	which	in	all	cases	requires	a	foundation	(Fundament),	but	which	does	not	require	an	existing	terminus	of	the	relation.	According	to	the	basic	theory,	my	desire	for	an	ice	cream	is	a	relation	between	an	act	and	an	internal	entity;	on	the	enhanced	theory,	it	is	a	three-term	relation	between	my	desire,	the	represented	object,	and	the	ice	cream	(which	may	or	may	not	exist).	In	reism,	intentionality	is	spelled	out	in	terms	of	a	foundation	(e.g.,	“ice-cream-Wisher”	that	I	present	in	recto)	which	has	a	terminus	in	
obliquo	(e.g.,	an	ice	cream).	The	“terminus	in	obliquo,”	however,	has	no	ontological	power:	it	is	simply	an	aspect	of	the	Wisher	or	the	way	in	which	the	Wisher	wishes	(e.g.,	as	wishing	ice-creamily).69		In	this	way,	Brentano	can	avoid	an	ontological	commitment	to	intentional	entities	by	providing	a	theory	of	intentionality	that	holds	equally	for	all	presentations.			
Husserl’s	accounts	of	intentionality.	Let	us	return	now	for	a	moment	to	Brentano’s	enhanced	theory.	More	than	its	connection	with	Frege,	it	is	the	link	to	Husserl’s	theory	of	intentionality	that	seems	most	interesting.	The	enhanced	theory	that	Brentano	developed	mostly	between	the	1870s	and	the	1890s	strongly	emphasizes	the	distinction	between	content	and	object	in	cases	where	names	or	statements	are	asserted,	and	clearly	states	that	in	some	cases,	a	name	expresses	a	presentation’s	content	but	does	not	name	any	object.	This	does	not	necessarily	mean	that	the	distinction	between	content	and	object	only	holds	for	acts	of	meaning,70	but	it	is	at	least	true	that	acts	of	meaning	are	the	cases	that	most	clearly	disclose	this	distinction.	In	this																																																									
68 The lack of comprehensiveness of the enhanced theory also affected his account of truth from the same period, 
which has been characterized recently as a “deflationist account” (Brandl 2017). 
69 This is also why Brentano’s reistic theory is often described as an adverbial theory of intentionality. See 
Chisholm (1957) and Chrudzimski and Smith (2004). 
70 Münch (2004, p. 222 fn) suggests such a view. 
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respect,	Husserl’s	idea	that	directedness	toward	an	object	is	nothing	but	a	property	of	acts	of	meaning,	as	developed	in	the	Logical	Investigations	and	in	line	with	Husserl	(1991a/1999),	follows	and	radicalizes	Brentano’s	enhanced	theory	wherein	acts	of	meaning	simply	highlight	the	distinction	between	content	and	object.	Building	on	both	Brentano	and	Bolzano,	Husserl	defended	the	thesis	in	Husserl	(1991a/1999)	that	there	are	objectless	presentations	(like	the	presentation	of	the	god	Jupiter,	or	of	a	golden	mountain).	Intentionality	in	this	context	is	a	property	of	the	content	of	meaning	(Meinen)	something,	and	is	not	conceived	as	a	relation	at	all.	As	Husserl	puts	it	in	the	
Logical	Investigations,	I	do	not	present	Jupiter	differently	than	I	present	Bismarck:	since	intentionality	is	a	property	of	the	content	of	meaning	something,	both	acts	are	intentional	in	the	same	sense.	As	a	consequence	of	this	view,	it	seems	that	the	non-existence	of	the	god	Jupiter	has	nothing	to	do	with	intentionality.	Generalizing	this	consequence	would	lead	to	the	view	that	acts	of	meaning	are	quite	distinct	in	kind	from	acts	of	reference.		Another	important	component	of	Husserl’s	early	account	of	intentionality,	which	is	absent	from	Brentano’s	enhanced	theory,	is	that	meaning	acts	instantiate	ideal	species.	This	relationship	of	instantiation	is	what	allows	for	the	objectivity	of	meaning.		Around	1908,	Husserl’s	views	on	the	theory	of	meaning	changed	considerably.	In	his	lectures	on	this	topic	(Husserl	1986),	he	introduces	the	distinction	between	“phansic	meaning”	[phansische	Bedeutung],	which	is	the	Bedeutung	of	meaning	acts	(Meinungsakte)	in	terms	of	species,	and	the	“ontic”	or	“phenomenological”	meaning,	which	is	“the	intentional	object	as	meant.”	This	distinction	seems	to	remediate	to	the	consequences	of	the	earlier	theory	exposed	above.	In	acts	of	meaning	(Meinen),	expressed	for	instance	by	my	utterances	about	Jupiter,	there	is	a	Bedeutung	which	is	instantiated	in	my	act;	but	prior	to	this	there	is	an	ontic	correlate	of	the	act,	the	“thought-of	Jupiter”,	which	is	the	object-as-intended.	Husserl	sometimes	calls	this	type	of	entity	a	“noematic	sense,”	and	later,	in	1913,	simply	the	“noema.”		If	Husserl’s	theory	of	intentionality	in	the	Logical	Investigations	has	often	been	described	as	an	adverbial	theory,	for	its	rejection	of	the	relational	interpretation	of	intentionality	(wherein	there	are	objectless	presentations)	and	its	characterization	of	intentionality	as	a	property	of	acts	of	meaning	(Meinen),	the	noematic	theory	of	the	Ideas	seems	to	bring	back	a	relational	conception	of	intentionality,	independently	of	whether	we	conceive	of	the	noema	as	an	object	from	a	perspective	(Drummond	1990)	or	as	some	kind	of	Fregean	sense	(Føllesdal	1969;	Smith	and	MacIntyre	1982).	In	either	case,	
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however,	the	noema	plays	the	role	of	the	correlate	in	a	sense	which	is	reminiscent	of	Brentano’s	intentional	correlates	in	the	enhanced	theory.		
Consciousness	Besides	the	intentional	thesis,	the	second	most	important	thesis	in	Brentano’s	psychology	is	based	on	a	further	constitutive	characteristic	of	mental	phenomena,	namely	the	fact	that	only	mental	phenomena	are	innerly	perceived	(Brentano	1874/2015:	118f/95f).		The	gist	of	this	idea	is	clearly	expressed	in	the	Psychology:			“the	presentation	of	the	sound	and	the	presentation	of	the	presentation	of	the	sound	form	a	single	mental	phenomenon,	it	is	only	by	considering	it	in	its	relation	to	two	different	objects,	one	of	which	is	a	physical	phenomenon	and	the	other	a	mental	phenomenon,	that	we	divide	it	conceptually	into	two	presentations.	In	the	same	mental	phenomenon	in	which	the	sound	is	present	to	our	minds	we	simultaneously	apprehend	the	mental	phenomenon	itself.”		(Brentano	1874/2015:	167/132).		The	“apprehension”	(Erfassen)	of	the	mental	phenomenon	itself	is	what	Brentano	calls	consciousness	or	inner	consciousness.	As	the	sound	is	co-present	(with	the	mental	phenomenon	itself)	in	our	apprehension,	consciousness	implies	intentionality,	which	means	that	there	is	no	consciousness	of	an	act	which	is	not	already	directed	towards	an	object.	But	since	intentionality	and	consciousness	are	both	essential	features	of	mental	acts,	the	implication	works	the	other	way	around	as	well:	there	is	no	intentional	directedness	of	an	act	which	is	not	itself	conscious.	This	also	explains	Brentano’s	particular	position	on	the	unconscious:	since,	in	our	experience,	there	are	no	intentional	acts	which	are	not	conscious,	and	since	there	is	no	consciousness	of	an	act	which	is	not	already	intentional,	then	there	is	no	“unconscious	consciousness,”	although	the	idea	of	an	non-conscious	intentional	act	involves	no	contradiction.	Nevertheless,	intentionality	and	consciousness	are	co-extensive.		 Brentano’s	“apprehension”	is	double:	in	every	mental	phenomenon,	we	apprehend	the	object	of	the	mental	phenomenon	and,	incidentally	(en	parergo)	the	mental	phenomenon	itself.	It	would	be	wrong,	however,	to	consider	the	apprehension	as	an	element	distinct	from	the	mental	phenomenon	itself:	in	presenting	the	table,	the	primary	object	of	my	act	is	the	table,	and	the	secondary	object	is	the	presenting	itself.			 An	objection	that	might	be	raised	to	such	a	theory	is	that	it	may	involve	an	infinite	regress.	If	my	presentation	of	the	sound	is	conscious	because	of	my	presentation	
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of	the	presentation	of	the	sound,	what	makes	the	presentation	of	the	presentation	of	the	sound	itself	conscious?	Brentano	himself	reacted	to	this	objection	by	underlining	the	fact	that	a)	both	belong	to	one	single	and	indivisible	mental	act,	and	that	b)	through	its	existence,	the	presentation	of	the	sound	‘inwardly	contributes’	to	the	existence	of	the	presentation	of	the	presentation	of	the	sound	(Brentano	1874/2015:	167/132).	Therefore	the	regress	does	not	even	begin,	since	the	presentation	of	the	sound	is	“intertwined”	(verwoben)	with	the	presentation	of	its	presentation.	And	since	the	existence	of	the	former	contributes	to	the	existence	of	the	latter	(but	not	the	other	way	around),	the	objection,	according	to	which	the	latter	makes	the	former	conscious,	does	not	seem	to	apply.		 The	intimate	intertwining	between	the	presentation	of	the	sound	and	the	presentation	of	that	presentation	evoked	by	Brentano	is	an	essential	part	of	his	conception	of	the	unity	of	consciousness	and	of	the	various	mereological	dependency	relations	among	parts	of	the	mental.	The	relationship	between	the	presentation	of	the	sound	and	the	presentation	of	the	presentation	of	the	sound	is	a	one-sided	distinctional	separability:	you	may	have,	theoretically	or	“distinctionally,”	a	presentation	of	the	sound	without	a	presentation	of	the	presentation	of	the	sound,	at	least	insofar	as	this	notion	does	not	involve	a	contradiction.	But	the	reverse	is	not	the	case.	Here,	“distinctional”	means	that	the	one-sided	separability	is	not	found	in	the	acts	themselves,	but	in	our	description	of	them.	In	contrast,	real	one-sided	detachability	is	involved	in	the	relation	between	a	presentation	of	the	sound	and	a	judgment	acknowledging	the	existence	of	the	sound	or	a	feeling	of	pleasure	on	hearing	the	sound.	You	may	have	a	presentation	of	the	sound	without	feeling	pleasure	about	the	sound,	but	you	cannot	take	pleasure	in	the	sound	without	presenting	it.	These	different	dependence	relations	between	parts	of	the	mental	are	the	basis	of	what	Brentano	describes	as	the	“unity	of	consciousness,”	i.e.,	the	fact	“that	all	mental	phenomena	which	occur	within	us	simultaneously	such	as	seeing	and	hearing,	thinking,	judging	and	reasoning,	loving	and	hating,	desiring	and	shunning,	etc.,	no	matter	how	different	they	may	be,	all	belong	to	one	unitary	reality	only	if	they	are	inwardly	perceived	as	existing	together”	(1874/2015:	126/101).		In	an	influential	objection	to	Brentano’s	account	of	consciousness,	Husserl	points	out	that	it	seems	implausible	to	say	that	when	I	see	a	house,	what	I	am	aware	of	is	my	presentation	of	sensory	contents	(Husserl	1901a,	237).	To	be	sure,	sensory	contents	are	experienced,	but	they	are	present	to	consciousness	only	to	the	extent	that	they	serve	as	a	vehicle	for	the	perception	of	objects,	not	as	objects	of	inner	perception.	This	is	in	line	
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with	Husserl’s	critique	of	Brentano’s	concept	of	intentionality	according	to	which	sensations	are	not	intentional,	since	they	do	not	provide	us	with	objects	(see	above).	This	does	not	mean,	however,	that	Husserl	considers	sensory	contents	not	to	be	part	of	consciousness:	rather,	the	idea	is	that	sensory	contents	are	experienced	as	intrinsically	subjective,	and	in	fact	not	as	‘contents’	at	all,	but	as	phenomenological	and	real	(reelle)	constituents	of	experiences.	It	must	be	said,	however,	that	Husserl’s	objection	is	not	completely	fair	to	Brentano’s	account,	as	Brentano	never	argued	that	the	inner	perception	of	a	mental	phenomenon	(say	a	presenting)	takes	this	presenting	as	an	object	in	the	same	sense	as	the	presentation	itself	has	an	object.	Calling	them	‘primary’	and	‘secondary’	objects	is	definitively	a	suboptimal	choice.	Nevertheless,	in	this	context	Husserl’s	point	has	the	merit	of	forcefully	stressing	this	difference:	the	subjective	constituents	of	experience	do	not	stand	before	us	as	objects.	Another	interesting	feature	of	Husserl’s	concept	of	consciousness	that	contrasts	with	Brentano’s	account	is	the	distinction	between	the	epistemic	authority	of	inner	perception	and	its	adequateness.	Following	Brentano,	Husserl	holds	that	only	inner	perception	is	evident	and	can	thereby	provide	the	grounds	for	secure	knowledge.	Outer	perception,	in	contrast,	can	only	give	us	probable	knowledge.	Brentano	sees	the	epistemic	authority	of	inner	perception	as	constitutive	of	consciousness:	on	his	view,	since	only	mental	phenomena	are	given	as	they	are,	I	am	only	conscious	of	(i.e.,	I	can	innerly	perceive	only)	mental	phenomena,	and	not,	e.g.,	of	physical	happenings	in	my	body,	houses,	or	chairs.	An	important	consequence	of	this	account	is	that	I	am	conscious	only	of	whatever	mental	phenomenon	is	occurring	now:	there	is	no	proper	consciousness	of	a	temporally	extended	object,	temporally	extended	mental	processes,	or	simply	past	experiences.	For	Husserl,	in	contrast,	the	alleged	epistemic	authority	of	inner	perception	constrains	our	analyses	of	conscious	experiences	far	too	much,	requiring	us	to	discard	a	huge	variety	of	experiences	which	are	obviously	conscious	in	a	phenomenologically	relevant	sense,	such	as	hearing	a	song,	thinking	about	a	mathematical	problem,	remembering	one’s	child's	first	footsteps,	seeing	a	train	pass	by,	enjoying	a	cigar,	feeling	the	urgent	need	to	sneeze,	etc.	These	experiences,	Husserl	contends,	do	not	have	the	same	epistemic	authority	as	those	involving	a	mental	phenomenon	that	is	occurring	now,	but	they	still	display	some	adequacy	to	what	is	given	in	them,	what	he	also	calls	their	“presentness.”	
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There	are	different	ways	of	spelling	out	what	“presentness”	means.	Based	on	the	examples	mentioned	above,	one	practical	way	to	illustrate	this	idea	is	the	description	of	time-consciousness.	On	Brentano’s	account,	there	is	no	time-consciousness	properly	speaking,	but	rather	a	continuum	of	mental	phenomena	related	to	one	another	by	“originary	association.”	This	does	not	belong	as	such	to	the	realm	of	the	mental,	but	is	an	innate	associative	feature	which	relates	the	contents	of	outer	perception	at	different	times	to	each	other,	and	which	gives	us	the	impression	that	we	perceive	a	motion,	a	figure,	or	any	temporally	extended	entity.	On	this	account,	time-consciousness	is	only	consciousness	at	a	time,	but	thanks	to	originary	association,	we	“retain”	past	contents	at	a	given	time.	This	is	the	basic	idea	behind	Brentano’s	account	of	time-consciousness.71	Husserl’s	account	of	time-consciousness	(Husserl	1966/1991)	preserves	the	gist	of	Brentano’s	account	–	its	retentional	structure	–		but	also	adds	an	idea	introduced	in	Stern	(1897/2005),	namely	that	“mental	events	that	play	themselves	out	within	a	certain	stretch	of	time	can	under	circumstances	form	a	unified	and	complex	act	of	consciousness	regardless	of	the	non-simultaneity	of	individual	parts.	That	stretch	of	time	over	which	such	a	mental	act	can	be	extended	I	call	its	presence	time	(Präsenz-
Zeit)”	(Stern	1897/2005,	pp.	326-7/p.	315).	Husserl’s	analysis	of	time-consciousness	combines	Brentano’s	and	Stern’s	accounts	in	the	following	way:	while	hearing	c	now	(at	t3)	after	having	heard	b	at	t1	and	a	at	t0,	I	have	i)	a	primal	impression	(Urimpression)	of	c	accompanied	by	ii)	retention	of	b	and	a	and	iii)	protention	of	what	I	am	about	to	hear.	The	three	elements	(i)	to	(iii)	are	as	such	merely	a	refinement	of	Brentano’s	retentional	model.	The	difference	with	Brentano’s	account	is	that	the	structure	depicted	by	(i)	to	(iii)	is	itself	not	a	“now-point,”	as	Brentano	has	it,	but	should	be	considered	itself	as	a	flow,	along	the	lines	of	Stern’s	account:	“the	retention	that	exists	‘together’	with	the	consciousness	of	the	now	is	not	‘now,’	is	not	simultaneous	with	the	now,	and	it	would	make	no	sense	to	say	that	it	is”	(Husserl	1962/1991:	333/345-6).	Husserl’s	presentness	therefore	proposes	an	account	of	the	unity	of	time-consciousness:	namely,	of	the	intuitively	plausible	idea	that	our	experience	of	succession	is	a	unitary	(and	fully	conscious)	phenomenon,	and	not	a	succession	of	separate	experiences.	This	idea	would	go	on	to	play	a	central	role	in	his	later	transcendental	phenomenology.		
Emotions	and	values																																																									
71 See Fréchette (2017a) for a more detailed account of the different features of this account. 
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Brentano	distinguishes	between	three	classes	of	mental	phenomena:	presentations,	judgments,	and	acts	of	love	and	hate.	The	last	class	encompasses	emotions,	volitions,	desires,	and	feelings.	Emotions	(but	this	also	applies	by	extension	to	the	other	phenomena	in	this	class),	like	judgments,	have	two	polarly	opposed	types:	either	we	love	or	we	hate	Wiener	Melange,	in	a	manner	that	is	similar	to	the	way	in	which	we	either	acknowledge	or	reject	something’s	existence.	The	polarly	opposed	types	of	judging	(acknowledging/rejecting)	and	emoting	(loving/hating)	are	similar	because	in	both	cases,	correctness	resp.	incorrectness	are	constitutive	of	the	definition	of	what	is	true	(correct	acknowledgement)	and	what	is	good	(correct	love).	This	makes	Brentano’s	account	of	emotions	an	evaluative	account	of	the	following	sort:	i)	emotions	are	mental	acts	which	constitutively	involve	a	valuing	of	their	intentional	object	(as	good	or	bad),	ii)	the	value	of	an	emotion	is	fixed	by	its	correctness	or	incorrectness,	and	iii)	the	correctness	of	an	emotion	is	nothing	but	its	‘fittingness’	with	respect	to	the	object	intended	as	valuable.	My	love	of	coffee	is	a	valuing,	a	position	taking,	a	positive	emotion	towards	coffee:	my	emotion	is	valuable	iff	it	is	correct	to	love	coffee	and	it	is	correct	to	love	coffee	iff	the	loving	fits	the	coffee	(or	in	other	words:	iff	coffee	is	worthy	of	love).72	How	do	we	come	to	know	that	coffee,	or	anything,	is	worthy	of	love?	Before	answering	this	question,	let	us	return	to	principle	(e).		As	mentioned	above,	Brentano	seems	to	have	defended	two	basic	theories	of	the	nature	of	correctness.	The	first	theory	fully	embraces	feature	(iii):	it	describes	correctness	as	a	genuine	relation,	the	relation	of	fitting	(Angemessenheit).	In	some	places,	Brentano	holds	that	the	relationship	involves	a	deontic	norm	(for	my	love	of	coffee	to	be	is	for	my	love	of	coffee	to	be	as	it	ought	to	be73);	but	in	most	texts,	he	maintains	that	it	holds	with	an	object	as	valuable:	“in	cases	where	our	behaviour	(Verhalten)	is	correct	our	emotion	corresponds	to	the	object,	is	in	harmony	with	its	value,	and	that,	on	the	other	hand,	in	cases	where	our	behaviour	is	wrong	(verkehrt)	it	is	opposed	(widerspreche)	to	its	object,	is	in	a	relation	of	disharmony	with	its	value”	(Brentano	1930/1966:	25/14-5,	translation	modified).	The	second,	later	theory	of	the	nature	of	correctness	proposes	an	important	amendment	to	feature	(iii),	namely	(iiia):	that	the	correctness	of	an	emotion	is	not	a	relation	of	actual	
																																																								
72 Brentano (1889/1902, pp. 75-7/pp. 69-71; p. 17/pp. 11-2; 1930/1966, p. 25/pp. 14-5; 1959, p. 169; 
1968, p. 141). 
73 See Mulligan (forthcoming) for this specific account of fittingness exposed by Brentano in 1906. See also 
Fréchette (2015) on Kraus’ interpretation of this account.  
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fitting,	but	rather	it	is	simply	experienced	as	such,	it	manifests	itself	as	correct:74	“the	concept	of	correctness	is	made	manifest	to	us	in	precisely	the	way	in	which	other	concepts	are	made	manifest	to	us.	We	consider	a	multiplicity	of	things	each	of	which	exemplifies	the	concept	and	we	direct	our	attention	upon	what	these	things	have	in	common.	Whenever	I	perceive	that	I	judge	with	evidence	I	am	aware	of	myself	as	someone	who	is	judging	correctly….	And	now,	so	far	as	the	correctness	of	our	emotive	attitudes	is	concerned,	we	find	that	the	situation	is	completely	analogous....	One	can	never	find	the	criterion	of	correctness	in	an	adaequatio	rei	et	intellectus	vel	amoris:	it	can	be	found	only	in	those	attitudes	which	we	know	with	immediate	evidence	to	be	correct.”75		Like	Marty	and	Meinong,	Husserl	accepted	all	the	components	of	Brentano’s	account	of	emotions	and	values	already	mentioned	but	rearranges	them	in	a	significantly	different	way,	amending	feature	(iii)	in	(iiib):	the	correctness	of	an	emotion	is	grounded	in	a	state	of	value	(Wertverhalt).	This	amended	feature	was	also	the	one	preferred	by	Marty,	but	also	by	many	early	realist	phenomenologists	such	as	Reinach	and	Daubert.	In	analogy	with	states	of	affairs	which	are	the	correctness-makers	of	true	judgments,	states	of	value	are	‘value-makers’	of	correct	emotings.76			
Psychologism	and	Anti-Psychologism	In	considering	the	specificity	of	Husserl’s	phenomenology	with	respect	to	Brentano’s	philosophical	programme	in	general,	and	its	contrast	with	Brentano’s	five	principles	described	above	in	particular,	the	importance	of	Husserl’s	strong	realism	regarding	the	objects	of	intentional	acts	–	exemplified	here	in	his	account	of	value	–	should	not	be	underestimated.	In	order	to	capture	more	precisely	this	specificity,	here	we	will	look	at	his	critique	of	psychologism	in	the	Logical	Investigations.	This	critique	largely	shaped	discussion	on	phenomenology	in	the	school	of	Brentano	at	the	beginning	of	the	20th	century.	It	was	also	determinant	in	the	later	positioning	of	phenomenology	as	a																																																									
74 Chisholm (1986, p. 53) uses precisely Brentano’s late theory to show that Brentano’s account of emotion is an 
account of fitting attitudes. We might indeed reword (iiia) in order to keep the fitting relation, for instance by 
saying that an emotion is correct iff “it is appropriate, or fitting, for me to feel this strong pro-attitude toward this 
experience” (see also Feldman and Feldman 2015, and similarly Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 2004). 
Mulligan (forthcoming) makes a convincing case that attributing a fitting attitude theory to the late Brentano is 
“wrong or highly misleading.” The main reason is that Brentano’s late reism aims to reject the relational 
conception of intentionality. Since emotions are intentional acts, it is reasonable to think that their correctness 
should not be considered in relational terms. 
75 Letter from Brentano to Kraus (1916), quoted in Chisholm (1966, pp. 399-400) 
76 See Husserl (1988). On Husserl and normative grounding, see Mulligan (forthcoming-b). 
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“pure	philosophy,”	along	with	Neo-Kantianism	and	Lebensphilosophie,	and	in	opposition	to	the	newly	emerging	experimental	psychology.		 As	mentioned	earlier	(section	1),	it	was	initially	his	exchange	with	Frege,	but	also	Frege’s	review	of	his	Philosophy	of	Arithmetics,	which	convinced	Husserl	of	the	shortcomings	of	his	Brentanian	account	of	arithmetics.	In	a	nutshell,	Frege	argued	that	Husserl’s	lack	of	a	distinction	between	concept	and	object	made	it	impossible	for	him	to	distinguish	between	the	subjective	and	the	objective,	and	between	the	marks	of	an	object	and	the	properties	of	a	concept.	If	numbers	are	subjective	contents	of	presentation,	then	Husserl’s	Brentanian	account	of	arithmetics	would	fail	to	give	a	proper	account	of	identity,	which	challenges	not	only	the	objectivity	of	arithmetic,	but	also	the	idea	that	the	distinction	between	sense	and	reference	is	objective.			 In	1928,	Husserl	conceded	to	his	student	Boyce-Gibson	that	Frege’s	critique	“hit	the	nail	on	the	head,”77	which	recalls	the	quote	from	Goethe	at	the	beginning	of	the	
Prolegomena.	Another	important	influence	in	Husserl’s	early	critique	of	psychologism	is	to	be	found	in	Bolzano,	who	Husserl	credits	for	showing	him	the	importance	of	objective	ideas	(Vorstellungen	an	sich)	and	propositions	in	themselves	(Sätze	an	sich)	for	the	development	of	a	pure	logic	(Husserl	2002:	298-99).		Lotze	was	also	an	important	influence	on	the	development	of	Husserl’s	pure	logic	(see	Husserl	1979,	p.	156).		 Husserl’s	critique	of	logic	as	a	practical	and	normative	discipline	(a	sub-discipline	of	psychology)	in	the	Prolegomena	is	based	on	the	idea	that	normative	disciplines	are	in	any	case	at	least	partly	grounded	in	theoretical	disciplines:	“Every	normative	proposition	of,	e.g.,	the	form	‘An	A	should	be	B’	implies	the	theoretical	proposition	‘Only	an	A	which	is	B	has	the	properties	C’,	in	which	‘C’	serves	to	indicate	the	constitutive	content	of	the	standard-setting	predicate	‘good’	(e.g.,	pleasure,	knowledge,	…)	The	new	proposition	is	purely	theoretical:	it	contains	no	trace	of	the	thought	of	normativity”	(Husserl	1900/2001a:	48/38).		 The	Prolegomena	also	offers	a	detailed	critique	of	the	consequences	of	psychologism	in	logic,	most	notably	on	the	problematic	interpretation	of	logical	principles	(like	the	law	of	non-contradiction)	and	of	the	laws	of	syllogistics	in	psychological	terms,	as	well	as	the	relativism	implied	by	psychologism.	The	book	had	a	central	influence	on	the	development	of	anti-psychologism	in	German	philosophy																																																									
77 See Spiegelberg (1971, p. 66) and (1982, p. 151). A similar affirmation is reported in Føllesdal (1982, p. 53) 
who mentions a discussion he had with Ingarden: “He [Roman Ingarden] told me that he once asked Husserl 
whether Frege had influenced him, and Husserl answered ‘Freges Bedeutung war entscheidend’.”  
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between	1901	and	1920,	with	reactions	from	Schlick	to	the	Neo-Kantians	Kroner,	Windelband,	and	Rickert.	In	the	school	of	Brentano,	Husserl’s	critique	of	psychologism	was	received	with	mitigated	feelings.	In	1904,	Meinong	openly	agreed	with	Husserl	in	his	Theory	of	Objects:	“the	entire	tenor	of	the	Logical	Investigations,	as	well	as	many	of	the	particular	statements	that	are	contained	in	it,	convinces	one	that,	despite	certain	differences	in	detail	(at	present	unavoidable),	the	author’s	goal	is	the	same	as	our	own”	(Meinong	1904/	1960:	22/94).	Some	years	later,	in	Functions	and	Products	(Funktionen	und	
Gebilde),	Twardowski	(1914/1999a)	also	followed	Husserl’s	critique	of	psychologism	in	his	theory	of	Gebilde,	as	did	Husserl’s	own	mentor	in	Halle,	Carl	Stumpf,	in	
Erscheinungen	und	psychische	Funktionen	(1907).		 Brentano	himself	remained	highly	critical	of	Husserl’s	charge	against	psychologism,	seeing	himself	as	the	target	of	unjust	accusations.	The	main	motivation	for	Brentano’s	reaction	lay	in	Husserl’s	arguments	against	the	conception	of	logic	as	a	technique	(Kunstlehre),	as	a	practical	subdiscipline	of	psychology,	which	is	the	account	of	logic	that	Brentano	defended	in	his	lectures.	Husserl	corroborated	this	reaction	in	his	reminiscences	of	Brentano,	in	which	he	recalls	that	despite	many	efforts,	he	and	Brentano	“did	not	reach	any	agreement	[on	Husserl’s	former	fight	against	psychologism]”	(Husserl	1919/1976,	p.	166/p.	54).	But	the	charge	and	its	reception	by	Brentano,	and	thereby	the	disagreement	between	Brentano	and	Husserl	on	psychologism,	is	based	on	a	double	misunderstanding.		On	the	one	hand,	Brentano	did	not	see	the	motivation	(or	did	not	acknowledge	the	legitimacy)	of	Husserl’s	attempt	to	ground	the	laws	of	logic	in	a	discipline	of	mathematical	form	(Husserl	1900/2001a:	222/138-140),	what	Husserl	calls,	in	reference	to	his	colleague	from	Halle	Cantor,	the	pure	theory	of	multiplicities	(reine	
Mannigfaltigkeitslehre).	This	is	similar	to	the	relationship	of	Leibniz’s	combinatorics	to	the	foundation	of	arithmetics,	which	would	lead	to	the	foundation	of	pure	logic	and	with	it	to	a	unified	theory	of	science	(Wissenschaftslehre)	inspired	by	Bolzano,	encompassing	pure	grammar	(i.e.,	the	theory	of	the	a	priori	forms	of	meaning	and	the	laws	of	logical	validity,	which	allows	for	a	formal	ontology	–	i.e.,	a	science	of	objects	in	general),	and	pure	theory	of	probabilities.	In	Brentano’s	view	in	1905,	such	a	strategy	inevitably	leads	to	a	theory	of	“objects	of	thought	and	their	combinations”	(Husserl	1994,	p.	31).	He	himself	defended	this	theory	at	some	point	in	his	career	(see	above:	the	enhanced	theory),	but	abandoned	it	in	his	reism	as	implausible.		
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On	the	other	hand,	Husserl	did	not	really	do	justice	to	Brentano’s	descriptive	psychology,	which	he	associated	in	many	places	to	psychology	as	a	science	of	facts,	even	accusing	Brentano	in	this	respect	of	being	a	naturalist	(Husserl	1962/1977,	p.	37/p.	26).	To	the	contrary,	it	is	clear	that	the	laws	of	Brentano’s	descriptive	psychology	are	a	priori	laws,	and	that	in	his	account	descriptive	psychology	is	to	serve	as	a	basis	for	a	
characteristica	universalis	(Brentano	1895:	34).	In	this	respect,	Husserl’s	phenomenology	and	Brentano’s	descriptive	psychology	are	equally	anti-psychologistic.	The	only	difference	in	their	approach	lies	in	Husserl’s	advocacy	of	a	Platonistic	strategy	in	the	Logical	Investigations,	which	Brentano	considered	unnecessary,	granted	the	distinction	between	causal	laws	(e.g.,	of	genetic	psychology)	and	essential	laws	(e.g.,	of	descriptive	psychology).78			 	
																																																								
78 This chapter has been written with the support of the Austrian Science Foundation (FWF), Project number P-
27215. Thanks to the editor John Shand for many helpful remarks, to Johannes L. Brandl and Kevin Mulligan 
for written comments on a previous version, and to Paul Reeve for linguistic revision. 
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